

National Security Council File

1943 Middle East War, 23 October, 1943 — File No. 12

(6)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/23/73	B
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NSC			1175	
FOLDER TITLE				
(6)				

RESTRICTION CODES

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ACTION

5877

SECRET (GDS)

October 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President in His
Meeting with the Bipartisan Leadership,
October 24, 1973, 8:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab A for your approval are talking points for the President to use in his meeting with the Bipartisan Leadership of Congress. They are designed simply as an introduction for your substantive briefing.

At Tab B are suggested main points for your briefing.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the talking points at Tab A.

SECRET (GDS)

WBQ:HHS:tmt 10/23/73

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP

Wednesday, October 24, 1973
8:30 a.m. (1 hour)

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To brief the bipartisan leadership of Congress on the current situation in the Middle East.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: This meeting will provide another opportunity to bring the bipartisan leadership up to date on the situation in the Middle East. You last met with them on October 10.
- B. Participants: Bipartisan Leadership of Congress, Secretary Kissinger and key members of White House staff.
- C. Press Plan: Meeting to be announced. Press photo opportunity.

III. TALKING POINTS [Attached]

SECRET (GDS)

For Leadership Meeting

October 23, 1973

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For the President

TALKING POINTS

The Middle East Situation

1. I want to give you some background on how things stand in the Middle East. As you know, I asked Secretary Kissinger to go to Moscow last Saturday in response to a request by General-Secretary Brezhnev.
2. The meetings in Moscow achieved our basic objective of getting agreement on a ceasefire and establishing a basis for moving forward on the diplomatic front toward a general peace settlement.
3. After his talks in Moscow, Secretary Kissinger visited Israel in order to reassure the Israeli leadership that we had not changed our view on UN Resolution 242 and the need for a negotiated settlement. As you know, the Resolution passed by the UN on Sunday night explicitly calls for negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices leading to a just and durable peace.
4. Despite the ceasefire resolution, some fighting continues. We are trying to bring this to an end and will then engage in a serious diplomatic effort to move forward with negotiations.
5. I would like to ask Secretary Kissinger to give you a fuller account of the diplomatic situation.

SECRET (GDS)

WBQ:tmt 10/23/73

ACTION

5877

SECRET (GDS)

October 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Meeting with Bipartisan
Leadership of Congress, October 24, 1973,
8:30 a.m.

The Congressional Leadership will be particularly interested in learning the results of your trip to Moscow and Israel and to get a sense for the next steps on the diplomatic front that you may have in mind. You will want to make clear that we have not changed our interpretation of UN Resolution 242 and that last Sunday's ceasefire resolution calls for negotiations between the parties to the conflict, which is a significant step in gaining acceptance of the US (and Israeli) position that a peace agreement must be worked out in negotiation.

Talking Points

--I would like to bring you up to date on our diplomatic efforts. Last Friday, General-Secretary Brezhnev asked the President to send me to Moscow to talk about the Middle East crisis. The Soviet leaders were seriously interested in achieving a ceasefire promptly, and we managed to reach rapid agreement on the principles that became the basis for the UN Security Council Resolution late Sunday night.

--Our ability to deal directly and rapidly with Soviet leaders on a critical issue is a vindication of what we have been trying to achieve in the last two years.

--The Soviets obviously believed that the situation in the Middle East was jeopardizing detente and apparently decided to make concessions on the Middle East rather than face a severe worsening of our relations.

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--In other words, vested interested in US-Soviet relations created by the 1972 and 1973 summit meetings worked in our favor at a critical moment.

--The major points in that resolution are that there should be a ceasefire; that UN resolution 242 should be implemented in all its parts; and that there should be negotiations between the parties under appropriate international auspices leading to a just and durable peace.

--The key point, of course, is that negotiations are to take place between the parties.

--I told the Israeli leaders during my stop in Tel Aviv that we have not changed our view of the meaning of Resolution 242. It embodies general principles that should govern a peace settlement, but negotiations will be required to determine the final contents of a settlement. We have in mind that the parties should negotiate directly, with some involvement at appropriate times by the US and USSR.

--We have no fixed plan on how negotiations should proceed. For the moment, we want to get the fighting ended. Once that happens, we will address other issues such as arms supplies, on which no agreements have been reached, and issues of how to begin peace talks.

--Let me add a few words about why we believe it is important that the ceasefire be followed by negotiations leading toward a peace settlement. This recent round of hostilities has demonstrated the fragility of ceasefire arrangements that are not linked to a broader effort to reach a peace settlement. If this round of hostilities is not followed by a settlement, there is no reason that war could not occur again, perhaps on a larger and more costly scale. Therefore, we think the time is right for a serious peace effort that will reduce the future chances of war.

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01 IO-14
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST GUIDANCE
REF: STATE 203825

new
Oct 22 ~~classification~~
22 resolution

1. REFTEL TRANSMITTED TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION SUPPORTED BY U.S. AND USSR AND TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI WHEN INTRODUCING RESOLUTION.
2. IN ADDITION TO TEXT OF RESOLUTION AND SCALI STATEMENT, FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR GUIDANCE IN REPLYING TO QUERIES BY HOST GOVERNMENT.
3. FROM BEGINNING OF CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO STOP FIGHTING AND LAY BASIS FOR

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DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO BEGIN SERIOUS SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES ON WAYS TO END CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THIS WAR AND COULD LEAD TO OTHERS IN FUTURE IF SOLUTION NOT FOUND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

4. THIS OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, IN REGION WHERE BOTH U.S. AND USSR HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS, CONSTITUTED MAJOR TEST OF NEW U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND ERA OF DETENTE. FACT THAT WE AND SOVIETS WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON CONSTRUCTIVE, FORWARD LOOKING RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO END FIGHTING AND START NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED IS IMPORTANT VICTORY FOR POLICY OF DETENTE.

5. IMMEDIATE TASK IN DAYS AHEAD WILL BE TO STABILIZE CEASEFIRE. RESOLUTION DOES NOT SPELL OUT MECHANICS OF CEASEFIRE, WHICH WILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT BY PARTIES WITH SUCH ASSISTANCE AS THEY MAY SEEK FROM UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION ON THE GROUND.

6. RELATED ISSUE IS EARLY RELEASE OF POWS BY EACH SIDE. ISRAEL ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS, AND WE AND SOVIETS AGREED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS ACCOMPLISHED. FAILURE ACHIEVE EARLY POW EXCHANGE COULD BECOME OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON OTHER MATTERS.

7. WHILE GETTING CEASEFIRE WAS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP, KEY POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF RESOLUTION ARE PARA. 2, WHICH CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242 OF NOVEMBER 1967, AND PARA. 3 WHICH PROVIDES PROCEDURE FOR ACCOMPLISHING THAT. THESE TWO PARAS ARE CLOSELY LINKED. PARA 3 LANGUAGE IS FIRST TIME COUNCIL HAS ENDORSED NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED IN ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED ONLY PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE WAY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242, BUT WHICH ARABS HAVE ALWAYS OPPOSED IN PAST.

8. QUESTION OF "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS TO BE WORKED OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS. BOTH WE AND SOVIETS HAVE SAID WE ARE READY TO MAKE OUR JOINT

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GOOD OFFICES AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES AS A MEANS TO
FACILITATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

9. GIVEN COMPLEX ISSUES OF A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB-ISRAELI
SETTLEMENT AND DEEP-ROOTED DISTRUST THAT DIVIDES THE
PARTIES, IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC TO EXPECT RAPID
PROGRESS OR SMOOTH SAILING AHEAD. IMPORTANT NEW FACTOR,
HOWEVER, IS THAT BASIS HAS BEEN LAID FOR GETTING A
POLITICAL PROCESS STARTED IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE BOTH
SIDES, AFTER BITTER AND COSTLY EXPERIENCE OF THIS FOURTH
WAR IN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN WHICH NEITHER GAINED TOTAL
MILITARY VICTORY, HAVE INCENTIVE TO SEEK ALTERNATIVE TO
CONTINUED BELLIGERENCY. WE INTEND TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN
EFFORT TO GET THIS PROCESS STARTED AND MAKE IT WORK. KISSINGER

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

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
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E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PBOR, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING FOR JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SALAH CALLED AT DEPART-
MENT OCTOBER 23 TO EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS THAT JORDAN BEING
KEPT IN DARK ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET TALKS WHILE SOVIETS WERE
KEEPING EGYPT AND SYRIA IN PICTURE AND USG DOING SAME
WITH ISRAEL. HE FEARED JORDAN BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATENAS MET SALAH ALONG
LINKS STATE 209022, AND STRESSED THAT USG HAS JORDANIAN

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INTERESTS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND HAS NO DESIRE TO KEEP JORDAN IN DARK. SALAH SAID THAT U.S.-SOVIET SPONSORED OCTOBER 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION APPEARED TO COMPOUND AMBIGUITIES OF RESOLUTION 242. UNLESS U.S. AND SOVIETS TOOK POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF SETTLEMENT, WHAT GUARANTEE WAS THERE THAT NEGOTIATIONS TO BREAK DEADLOCK WOULD BE ANY MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED NOW THAN BEFORE OCTOBER 6? ATHERTON SAID U.S.-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW HAD FOCUSED ON CEASEFIRE AND PROCEDURES FOR GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES, UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES, COULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. AS FOR CHANCES FOR GETTING SETTLEMENT PROCESS MOVING, ATHERTON SAID IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE NEW SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED BY LATEST WAR,

BOTH IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON PARTIES, IN CHANGES IN MILITARY SITUATION, AND IN FACT THAT USG AND USSR WERE ENGAGED IN JOINT EFFORTS TO STOP FIGHTING AND GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE FELT SITUATION TODAY VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT EXISTING BEFORE OCTOBER 6 AND THERE WAS BETTER OPPORTUNITY NOW FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT TO BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR SALAH OF JORDAN CALLED AT OWN REQUEST ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON ON AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23 TO SEEK BACKGROUND OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22, 1973.

3. SALAH OPENED BY NOTING THAT SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BY SOVIETS, AND ISRAELIS WERE VISITED ON OCTOBER 22 BY SECRETARY KISSINGER. JORDAN, HOWEVER, REMAINED LARGELY "IN THE DARK" ABOUT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WHICH LED TO OCTOBER 22 RESOLUTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL. SALAH SAID HE HAD HOPED AT MINIMUM THAT SOMEONE FROM SECRETARY'S PARTY COULD HAVE VISITED AMMAN AFTER TEL AVIV STOP SINCE JORDAN WAS NOT ONLY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT BUT ALSO HEART OF THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE AND LINKED TO

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SETTLEMENT IN JERUSALEM AND ON FINAL BORDERS.

4. ATHERTON REPLIED HE APPRECIATED JORDANIAN CONCERN AND WANTED TO GIVE AMBASSADOR SALAH AS FULL A BRIEFING AS POSSIBLE ON BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION. TIMETABLE OF SECRETARY'S TRIP SIMPLY ALLOWED NO TIME FOR VISIT TO AMMAN. ATHERTON SAID HE WANTED TO CALL ATTENTION OF SALAH NOT ONLY TO TEXT OF RESOLUTION BUT ALSO TO ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI. ATHERTON SAID SCALI STATEMENT, WHICH SALAH DID NOT HAVE, WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED AND MERITED PRECISE READING.

5. ATHERTON SAID THAT SINCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT U.S. HAD PURSUED TWO OBJECTIVES: (A) STOP THE FIGHTING, AND (B) LAY BASIS FOR FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS IN MIDDLE EAST. RESOLUTION 338 IS EFFORT ACCOMPLISH BOTH PURPOSES. IT CONTAINS PARAGRAPHS CALLING FOR END OF FIGHTING, IMPLEMENTATION OF 242, AND PROCEDURE TO CARRY OUT IMPLEMENTATION OF 242. ATHERTON SAID EVERYONE AWARE THAT IT NO REPEAT NO USE JUST TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING; IT IS NECESSARY TO END CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THE FIGHTING. IN ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC

ALTERNATIVE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE WARS IN THE FUTURE.

6. IT ALSO CLEAR, ATHERTON CONTINUED, THAT MIDDLE EAST WAS AREA IN WHICH BOTH US AND USSR HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS. MANNER IN WHICH US AND USSR DEALT WITH PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WAS THEREFORE TEST OF NEW US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND OF ERA OF DETENTE. FACT THAT WE AND SOVIETS AGREED ON FORWARD-LOOKING AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION IS VICTORY FOR POLICY OF DETENTE.

7. ATHERTON SAID THAT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO STABILIZE CEASEFIRE WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING LATER IN DAY OCTOBER 23 WOULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, IN-



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CLUDING QUESTION OF HOW TO USE UNTSO TO SUPERVISE
CEASEFIRE. ATHERTON NOTED THAT RESOLUTION WAS NOT
SPECIFIC ABOUT MECHANICS OF CEASEFIRE. THESE MUST BE
WORKED OUT BY THE PARTIES, USING UNTSO FACILITIES IF
DESIRED. RELATED ISSUE WAS POW EXCHANGE. WE HAD BEEN
IMPRESSED WHILE IN ISRAEL WITH IMPORTANCE ISRAEL
ATTACHES TO EARLY RELEASE OF POWS BY BOTH SIDES.
ALTHOUGH THIS NOT IN TEXT OF NEW RESOLUTION, SOVIETS
AND USG HAD BOTH AGREED TO URGE EARLY POW RELEASE LEST
PRISONER ISSUE BECOME SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS
ON OTHER MATTERS.

8. TURNING TO SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS, AS
"POLITICAL PARTS" OF RESOLUTION 338, ATHERTON SAID
THEY CLOSELY LINKED. THESE PARAGRAPHS MEAN THAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242 WOULD PROCEED
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED "UNDER
APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." ATHERTON NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE
FIRST TIME SC HAD ENDORSED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AS PRACTICAL MEANS OF PROCEEDING TO SOLUTION
OF PALESTINE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

9. "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES," SAID ATHERTON, REMAIN TO BE
WORKED OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS. US AND SOVIETS HAD AGREED
TO MAKE AVAILABLE JOINT GOOD OFFICES TO PARTIES CON-
CERNED, IF THEY SO DESIRED.

10. SALAH SAID THAT HE FEARED AMBIGUITY OF SC RESOLUTION
242 HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY AMBIGUITY OF RESOLUTION 338.
HE NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE NO CLOSE TIE BETWEEN
THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT. THE
GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WOULD NEED SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC

ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OR AGREEMENT ON HOW
RESOLUTION 242 WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. HOW ELSE, HE
ASKED, COULD JORDAN ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AS IT WOULD HAVE
TO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT? SALAH SAID THAT ON
ITS FACE RESOLUTION 338 APPEARED TO MEAN THAT SC HAD
ENDORSED IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE OMITTING ANY
REFERENCE TO UN OR SECRETARY GENERAL. SALAH SAID THAT

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NEGOTIATIONS AND AVOIDANCE OF UN INVOLVEMENT HAD LONG REPRESENTED TWO AIMS OF ISRAELI DIPLOMACY, AND THEY HAD NOW BEEN ADOPTED IN A TIME OF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF ISRAEL.

11. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT USG HAD LONG SEEN NEGOTIATIONS AS ONLY MEANS OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242. NOW, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AGAINST A NEW BACKGROUND. HE URGED SALAH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FACT THAT FIGHTING, WHICH VERY COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES, HAD CREATED PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND VERY DIFFERENT THAN THAT PRIOR TO WAR. ATHERTON NOTED THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO BOTH SIDES. SECOND, SAID ATHERTON, US AND USSR WERE NOW JOINTLY ENGAGED IN EFFORT TO GET PROCESS GOING. THIS IS THE SECOND NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION WHICH GIVES CAUSE FOR HOPE. FINALLY, SAID ATHERTON, FOCUS OF TALKS IN MOSCOW WAS NOT ON SUBSTANTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 BUT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE A FRAMEWORK FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES AND GETTING TALKS GOING. SALAH COULD NOT EXPECT US AND USSR TO RESOLVE ALL LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES ON INTERPRETATION OF 242.

12. SALAH ASKED WHAT WOULD MOVE THE ISRAELIS IF THEY DECIDED AFTER THIS LATEST WAR THAT THEIR BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO BECOME MORE OBSTINATE? WITH NEW LOSSES, SAID SALAH, ISRAELIS MAY DECIDE TERRITORY IS BETTER GUARANTEE OF SECURITY THAN SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT IT WAS TOO SOON TO JUDGE WHAT FINAL IMPACT OF WAR WOULD BE ON ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL. HE NOTED THAT WAR NOT ONLY HAD BEEN VERY COSTLY BUT CEASEFIRE HAD LEFT FOUR EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS ON EAST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL AS WELL AS ISRAELI ADVANCES IN SYRIA AND WEST OF CANAL. SITUATION TODAY WAS DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, STRATEGICALLY AND IN ITS MAJOR POWER ASPECTS FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN BEFORE OCTOBER 6.

13. SALAH ASKED WHO WAS GOING TO INITIATE TALKS?

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ATHERTON SAID THIS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT NOTED THAT RESOLUTION 338 MADE PROVISION FOR "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING BETWEEN US AND USSR, WOULD CONTINUE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

14. SALAH ASKED IF IN USG OPINION INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR INITIATION OF DISCUSSIONS. ATHERTON REITERATED THAT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT.

15. SALAH SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN HOPED THAT THE US INTERPRETATION OF 242, AS SET FORTH IN 1969, STILL STANDS. ATHERTON SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THE ORIGIN OF USG VIEWS ON FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS SET FORTH IN 1969 WAS IN US/SOVIET AND FOUR POWER TALKS AT THAT TIME, BUT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY ANYONE. WHAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE, ATHERTON SAID, WAS THAT OUR FOCUS IS NOT REPEAT NOT ON PUTTING FORTH U.S. PLANS FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT ON GETTING NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES COULD PUT OWN VIEWS ON TABLE, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. SC RESOLUTION 338 PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS. SALAH SAID HE FEARED THAT PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 338 WEAKENED PARAGRAPH 2. LATTER CALLED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242, BUT FORMER CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS ARE CLOSELY LINKED AND COMPLEMENTARY. FORMER CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242; LATTER CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE THAT END. THIS WAS ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 242, WHICH RECOGNIZES NEED FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES -- AGREEMENT THAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

16. SALAH RETURNED TO IDEA THAT CONTACTS WITH EVERYONE BUT JORDAN MADE HIM VERY UNEASY. HE SAID HE HAD PERSONAL FEAR THAT BIG POWERS WERE CONDUCTING BUSINESS WHILE TAKING JORDAN FOR GRANTED. ATHERTON STRONGLY DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE USG HAD THE



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INTERESTS OF JORDAN VERY MUCH IN MIND. AS FOR JORDAN'S BEING LEFT OUT, ATHERTON SAID, HE HAD CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR SALAH A FULL APPRECIATION OF MOSCOW TALKS, AS WE HAD DONE FOR ISRAEL DURING SECRETARY'S STOPOVER IN TEL AVIV.

17. SALAH COMPLAINED HE STILL FELT "IN THE DARK" AND

TURNUED TO ALLEGED QUOTATION OF PRIME MINISTER MEIR IN KNESSET WHERE SHE REPORTEDLY SAID SHE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY SECRETARY THAT NO PRESSURES WHATSOEVER WOULD BE APPLIED DURING NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH WOULD BE FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. ATHERTON SAID SALAH SHOULD LOOK TO STATEMENTS OF U.S., NOT ISRAELI SPOKESMEN AS REPRESENTING POSITION AND VIEWS OF USG. KISSINGER.



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INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 NEA-10 AID-20 OMB-01 ABF-01

TRSE-00 SS-20 NSC-10 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ME

SUBJECT: USG CONTRIBUTION TO ICRC FOR MIDEAST OPERATIONS

REF: GENEVA 5590

1. AMERICAN RED CROSS HAS TODAY CABLED DONATION OF \$25,000 TO ICRC IN RESPONSE TO APPEAL SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED REF. TEL. ARC IS ALSO CONTACTING AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY FOR DONATIONS OF MEDICAMENTS (ANTIBIOTICS, ANAESTHETICS, ANALGESICS, ANTI-SHOCK AND ANTI-TETANUS SERUM) TO SEND TO ICRC IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST. ARC ANTICIPATES REQUESTING USG ASSISTANCE FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT OF THESE ITEMS TO ICRC.

2. WE ARE GIVING SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO ICRC'S REQUEST FOR USG DONATION AND WILL ADVISE SHORTLY. KISSINGER ✓

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2017 (NO CONT OF SEQUENCE)*****

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT WARNING ISRAEL

1901913 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1310 GMT 23 OCT 73 L

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 23 TASS--THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WARNED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ABOUT THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES THAT THE CONTINUATION OF ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST EGYPT AND SYRIA WILL ENTAIL.

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED HERE SAYS THAT "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE EXPRESS AN ANGRY PROTEST AGAINST THE PERPETRIOUS ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND DEMAND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CEASE FIRE AND ALL THE HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE TROOPS OF THE ARAB STATES AND PULLBACK ITS TROOPS TO THE LINE OF CEASEFIRE OF OCTOBER 22, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF OCTOBER 22, 1973".

(1087)

23 OCT 1927Z 36/69

W-
23 Oct

FBIS 94

X PLAN PROPOSED FOR DOUBLING JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN GOLAN HEIGHTS

M230725 JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 0700 GMT 23 OCT 73 M

(TEXT) THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION'S SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT WILL COMPLETE WITHIN 1 WEEK A DETAILED PLAN TO DOUBLE JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THIS WILL BE DONE BY DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AND BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS AND AN URBAN CENTER. THIS WAS DECIDED YESTERDAY BY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AT ITS MEETING IN JERUSALEM.

23 OCT 1236Z SG/GG



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
ACDA-19 AID-20 DRC-01 /145 W
***** 053203

0 231043Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6309
INFO AMCONSUL ASMARA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AXEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 1172
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 12119

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, ET, IS, US, UR
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA BREAKS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT IEG DECLARATION RELEASED AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL
OCTOBER 23:

QUOTE
DECLARATION BY HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HAILE SELASSIE I ON THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ✓

IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE WORLD HAD REACHED THE BRINK OF CATAS-
TROPHE BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO SETTLE THE MIDDLEEAST CONFLICT.
WHILE WE TAKE SATISFACTION AT THE FACT THAT A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION
HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE
BASIS OF THE S/C RESOLUZION 242 AND THAT IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY
ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED, NEVERTHELESS, THE SERIOUS DAN-
GER INHERENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAS NOT YET BEEN AVERTED.

CONSISTENT WITH HER STAND OF OPPOSING TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ADDIS 12119 231145Z

ETHIOPIA HAS DONE HER BEST TO EFFECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE TERRITORIES OF EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA WHICH SHE OCCUPIED IN 1967. THE EFFORTS OF ETHIOPIA IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND AT THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCES AS WELL AS HER INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS IN HELPING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LASTING PEACE BY BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE FAILED. IT HAS BEEN THE FIRM CONVICTION OF ETHIOPIA THAT AS LONG AS ISRAEL REMAINS IN THE ARAB TERRITORIES SHE OCCUPIED IN 1967 A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. THE RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES IS A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS IS WHY THE CHARTERS OF THE OAU, OF THE UN AND THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED STATES REQUIRE THE RESPECT OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES. ANY DEROGATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE CAN ONLY LEAD TO BASIC DISTURBANCE OF PEACE AND TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISCARDED CONCEPT THAT MIGHT IS RIGHT. THERE IS NO VALID PRINCIPLE IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS THAT CAN SERVE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ANNEXATION OF ONE'S TERRITORY BY ANOTHER BY THE USE OF FORCE OF ARMS.

BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS FAILED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ETHIOPIA HAS DECIDED TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT ALL NATIONS WILL MAKE THEIR MAXIMUM CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS BRINGING PERMANENT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

OCTOBER 23, 1973
ADDIS ABABA.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET

Z 231814Z OCT 73 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 3033
BT
S E C R E T STATE 209018

6530 Q

#5

NODIS

Nixon → Faisal
Oct 23

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFCR, XF
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING FAISAL

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
KING FAISAL:

QUOTE: YOUR MAJESTY:

I APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 21.
SINCE IT WAS WRITTEN, YOUR MAJESTY, IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
HAVE OCCURRED -- DEVELOPMENTS WHICH CULMINATED OUR
QUIET DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS OF SEVERAL WEEKS AND WHICH, IN
MY JUDGMENT, CAN BECOME A SIGNIFICANT TURNING POINT FROM
WAR TO EVENTUAL PEACE IN THE AREA.

AS YOU HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY INFORMED, SECRETARY
KISSINGER'S INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY
BREZHNEV HAVE ACHIEVED IMPORTANT PRACTICAL RESULTS -- A
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE IN
PLACE, AND THE PROMPT IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CONCERNED UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES.

THIS ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH LAYS THE
BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD THE JUST AND LASTING PEACE
WE BOTH SEEK, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE
VIGOROUS EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION TO
SOVIET AGREEMENT, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING ISRAELI
ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND ITS COMMITMENT TO ENTER
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242.

THE PROCESS OF PEACE-MAKING WILL NOT BE EASY AND WILL
REQUIRE TIME. IT WILL ALSO REQUIRE THE FULL WEIGHT AND
COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY

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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- STATE 209018, OCT 23, NODIS

INFORMED YOUR MAJESTY, IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN THIS EFFORT, SO LONG AS WE HAVE THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFLICT.

I TRUST I CAN RELY ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING IN THIS ENDEAVOR IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. YOUR MAJESTY HAS A UNIQUE POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE UNITED STATES HAS A UNIQUE POSITION OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES THAT WE CONTINUE, AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST, TO REMEMBER THE INTERESTS WE HAVE IN COMMON AND NOT LET THEM BE OBSCURED IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT BY THE UNAVOIDABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE HARMFUL TO YOUR COUNTRY'S INTERESTS AS MUCH AS TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES; IT WOULD PLACE IN JEOPARDY OUR NEW EFFORTS FOR A JUST PEACE; AND IT WOULD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THREATEN THE INTERESTS OF MANY OF OUR COMMON FRIENDS IN EUROPE AND ASIA. YOU SHOULD NOT FORGET IT WAS FIRSTLY THE UNITED STATES WHICH SECURED THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE ADOPTION OF THE CEASEFIRE.

I RECIPROCATE YOUR MAJESTY'S WARM WISHES FOR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND FOR FURTHER PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY FOR THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF SAUDI ARABIA. SINCERELY,
RICHARD NIXON. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:
NEA - JJSISCO/ALATHERTON:AP

APPROVED BY:
THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCE:
S/S - MR. PICKERING
WH - GENERAL SCOWCROFT (SUBS)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

231403Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0243

6 4 6 1 Q
23 OCT 73 Z15 09

BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8513

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

MEIR - KEATING
11/23

1. AT HER REQUEST, I CALLED ON PRIMIN MEIR AT 12:30 TODAY. ALSO PRESENT WERE MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN IN PRIMIN'S OFFICE AND DCM.

2. THE PRIMIN INITIATED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING HER GREAT CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY FOR QUICK EXCHANGE OF POWS, NOTING THIS COULD BE MAJOR ITEM IN OPPOSITION (LIKUD ATTACK) AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN KNESSET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 6:00 PM TODAY. I FORTUNATELY WAS ABLE TO HAND HER COPY OF MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT (STATE 208876) WHICH SHE READ WITH GREAT RELIEF AND APPRECIATION NOTING "CH, GOOD: IV'VE BEEN WORRIED ABOUT THIS ALL MORNING." SHE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STATEMENT BE FEATURED ON ISRAEL RADIO THROUGH THE DAY.

3. SHE CONTINUED FOR AWHILE ON THE SUBJECT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION NOTING THAT THE OPPOSITION WILL NOT ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE AND INDEED MAY MAKE THE ISSUE A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE THIS AFTERNOON. SHE WAS SURE OF WINNING A MAJORITY VOTE ENDORSING THE GOVT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE BUT THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES WOULD SHOW THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVT'S ACTION.

4. MRS MEIR THEN EXPRESSED HER GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT YESTERDAY. SHE NOTED THAT HER CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY HELPED TO CLEAR UP SOME THINGS THAT WERE OBSCURED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH EVENTS PROCEEDED. SHE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HER SATISFACTION WITH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT.

5. I NOTED THAT THE BRITISH AMB HAD JUST CALLED ON ME AND, INTER ALIA, WAS PROEING FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS "IMPRESSION" THAT THE GOI AND US MIGHT HAVE SOME MAJOR DIFFERENCES OVER THE UN RESOLUTION. I ASSURED HER THAT I HAD DIASEUSED HIM OF ANY SUCH NOTION AT WHICH POINT MRS MEIR REMARKED "IT'S TOO BAD YOU COULDN'T HAVE MADE HIM HAPPIER."

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

SHE THEN RELATED A SERIES OF RECENT HISTORICAL ANECDOTES ILLUSTRATING WHY ISRAEL HAS SUCH A LOW OPINION OF "ALBION PEFFIDE."

6. WE THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE CEASEFIRE. MRS MEIR QUICKLY RAN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL QUICKLY AGREE TO THE CEASEFIRE. SHE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT THE IRACIS HAVE BEEN MOST UNHELPFUL TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD BY THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES. SHE STATED SHE WAS FRANKLY PUZZLED AS TO WHAT THE JORDANIANS WERE UP TO BY OFFICIALLY AGREEING TO THE CEASEFIRE AND THEN "LEAVING THEIR TANKS IN SYRIA." SHE SAID THAT THE KING "HAD GOOD REASON" TO PULL HIS TANKS BACK SINCE, AFTER ALL, EGYPT WAS THE FIRST ARAB COUNTRY TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE. POLITICALLY, THEREFORE, HUSSEIN IS COVERED. AS SHE HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY, SHE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR HUSSEIN'S POSITION AND THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION IN HER REMARKS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN.

7. AS WE TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH, I NOTED TO MRS MEIR THAT WE WERE PLEASED WITH TIMELINESS OF OUR IDF BRIEFINGS ON THE CEASEFIRE SITUATION ON THE SUEZ FRONT. IT APPEARED FROM THESE REPORTS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE ENGAGED IN WHOLESALE VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, AT LEAST IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, AND ISRAEL WAS RESPONDING TO THESE ATTACKS. I NOTED THE "DELICACY" OF THE MATTER I WAS ABOUT TO RAISE, BUT I ASSUMED SHE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME WHO MIGHT VIEW WITH SOME SCEPTICISM INFO FROM GCI SOURCES AND WHO WOULD WONDER WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT NOT BE TAKING INITIATIVES IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

8. MRS MEIR REPLIED SHE COULD UNDERSTAND THE POINT I RAISED. SHE THEN WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WHEN THE GCI WAS FORMULATING ITS POSITION ON THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION, THE ISRAELI MILITARY COMMANDERS "PLEADED" FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS MORE TIME IN THE SOUTH IN ORDER TO FINISH OFF THE EGYPTIANS IN THAT SECTOR. THE CABINET SAID A FLAT NO AND THE ORDERS WENT OUT THAT THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE RESPECTED SCRUPULOUSLY. ISRAEL HAS, HOWEVER, ORDERED ITS TROOPS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL AND UNLESS THE EGYPTIANS STOP. IN THIS RESPECT SHE DESCRIBED HER MEETING EARLY LAST NIGHT WITH IDF LEADERS TO CONSIDER REPORTS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE CONTINUING TO SHOOT. SHE CONCLUDED AT THAT TIME THAT THIS WAS NOT ABNORMAL SINCE SOME VIOLATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED FOR A

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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

VARIETY OF REASONS IN THE FIRST FEW HOURS AFTER A CEASEFIRE. (THE MFA TOOK THE SAME POSITION WHEN WE QUERIED THEM ON THIS SUBJECT LAST NIGHT AT 10:00 P.M.). LATER IN THE EVENING, HOWEVER, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, WAS NOT ISOLATED VIOLATIONS BUT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD LAUNCHED MAJOR MILITARY ATTACKS. SHE SAID THAT THE FIGHTING LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. ALTHOUGH SHE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVES CAME FROM LOCAL COMMANDERS WHO WERE TRYING TO COVER UP THEIR PREVIOUS LIES TO HEADQUARTERS AS CONCERNS THEIR VICTORIES, SHE WAS AFRAID THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FIGHTING SUGGESTED "ORDERS FROM THE TOP."

SECRET

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SECRET

Z 231403Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0244
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8513

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23 OCT 73 Z15 18

NODIS

9. MRS. MEIR WONDERED ALOUD "WHAT DO THE RUSSIANS DO WITH THE EGYPTIANS NOW?" I ASKED IF SHE THOUGHT THE RENEWED GROUND HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH REPRESENTED A DANGER OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT RENEGING ON ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE. SHE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND REPEATED THE PROBLEM WITH EGYPTIAN COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD NOT TELLING THE TRUTH TO CAIRO, WITH THE RESULT THAT SADAT APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE ANY ACCURATE MILITARY DATA BASE ON WHICH TO BASE POLITICAL DECISIONS.

10. MRS. MEIR THEN NOTED THAT, IN HER CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH THE SECRETARY AND ASST SECRETARY SISCO, SHE HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF A MECHANISM TO ASSURE A CEASEFIRE. SHE SAW MERIT IN THEIR SUGGESTION THAT ISRAELI MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SUEZ FRONT, PARTICULARLY WHERE SHOOTING IS GOING ON, MIGHT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO CONTACT THEIR EGYPTIAN COUNTERPARTS TO ARRANGE LOCAL TRUCES. SHE GAVE THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH HER MILITARY COMMANDERS WHO WERE NOT TOO ENTHUSIASTIC WITH THE IDEA SINCE SUCH HEAVY FIGHTING WAS GOING ON. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH A TRY EVEN IF THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT RESPOND SINCE THE EFFORT ITSELF WOULD HELP CERTIFY THE GOI'S BONAFIDES IN WISHING TO HAVE A REAL CEASEFIRE. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE THOUGHT THIS WAS WORTH RAISING AGAIN WITH THE MILITARY AND WOULD DO SO. #3,953S, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH HER SPEECH TODAY IN THE KNESSET SHOULD MAKE CLEAR ISRAEL'S SINCERE DESIRE FOR THE CEASEFIRE ALONG THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, SHE HAS TO ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ZSADAT CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS" - HE CANNOT OFFICIALLY AND PUBLICLY ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE AND THEN CLANDESTINELY GIVE ORDERS TO HIS SOLDIERS TO CONTINUE SHOOTING.

11. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD THE DILEMMA OF TRYING TO FIND A MEANS OF SETTING UP A MECHANISM TO POLICE A CEASEFIRE AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID INVOLVING THE UN. SHE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WOULD ONLY BE TOO ANXIOUS TO GET HIMSELF AND THE ENTIRE UN INVOLVED. IN THE

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Department of State

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
-2- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 2 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

INTEREST OF ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, SHE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE UNTSO SINCE, AS AN ORGANIZATION IN PLACE, IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE ON THE CHORE WITHOUT HAVING TO GO BACK TO THE UN FOR A NEW "MANDATE" AND THUS GIVE WALDHEIM AN OPENING THROUGH WHICH TO RUN INTO THE ACTION. SHE ASKED IF WE COULD TELL HER WHERE THE UNTSO OBSERVERS ARE WHO USED TO BE ALONG THE SUEZ. I TOLD HER WE WOULD CHECK OUR FILES AND BE IN TOUCH WITH HER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY. (ACCORDING TO OUR FILES THE UNTSO OBSERVERS WHO WERE ALONG THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL ARE IN CAIRO WHILE THOSE WHO WERE ALONG THE EAST BANK HAVE BEEN MOVED TO JERUSALEM. WE HAVE SO INFORMED THE PRIMIN'S OFFICE.)

12. COMMENT. MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT RE POW'S WILL GO LONG WAY TOWARDS HELPING MRS. MEIR WITH PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES LATER TODAY. I CANNOT EVALUATE MRS. MEIR'S CLAIM THAT LACK OF SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY SITUATION ON GROUND IN CAIRO IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN WHATEVER MISTAKES SADAT MAY BE MAKING NOW AS CONCERN MILITARY SITUATION. I NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT EBAN MAKE SAME COMMENTS TO ME IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON SUNDAY EVENING. AND, IF TRUE, I HAVE NO SOLUTIONS TO OFFER. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO SHOOT BACK AND IF EGYPTIAN ATTACKS CONTINUE I WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK DESIGNED TO WIPE OUT THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL. IF THINGS REACH THIS POINT, I'S NOT SURE WHAT KIND OF A CEASEFIRE WILL BE LEFT TO BUILD UPON. I ASSUME WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS SUBJECT AND CAN ONLY HOPE THEY SHARE OUR CONCERNS.

13. I HAVE JUST SEEN USUN 4139. MRS. MEIR DENIES ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE, BLAMES THE EGYPTIANS AND NOTES IDF GIVEN ORDERS TO SHOOT BACK.

KEATING



Department of State

FILE COPY
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 995

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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230033Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 417
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 4132

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, UN
SUBJ: CALL BY JORDANIAN AMB

ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
O'DEN
RATLIFF
RICHARDSON
SAUNDERS
SCHNEIDER
V.I.G.
WALSH

R

1. JORDANIAN PERMREP SHARAF CALLED ON AMB SCALI OCT 22 TO ASK ABOUT SHAPE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT ENVISAGED IN US-USSR SPONSORED RES (SC RES 338) AND MODALITIES FOR REACHING IT. SHARAF SAID AMMAN WAS WORRIED. SUPER POWERS HAD CLEARLY REACHED AGREEMENT ON MATTERS OF VITAL CONCERN TO JORDAN, BUT HAD LEFT IT OUT. FOR EXAMPLE, JORDAN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER UN WAS CONSIDERED "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT ROLES OF US, USSR AND SC WOULD BE, WHETHER INTERMEDIARIES WERE CONTEMPLATED FOR NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND WHAT US POSITION WAS ON TERRITORIAL CHANGES.

2. SCALI SAID HE APPRECIATED JORDANIAN INTEREST IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FOR PRESENT AT LEAST, HE WAS NOT IN POSITION EVEN TO SPECULATE ABOUT ISSUES WHICH SHARAF RAISED, THOUGH HE COULD ASSURE HIM US WAS WORKING FOR DURABLE SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD REMOVE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFLICT.

3. CONCLUDING, SHARAF STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF UNITED ARAB POSITION IN ACHIEVING LASTING PEACE. HE NOTED DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH JORDAN NOW FOUND ITSELF, HAVING ACCEPTED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

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CEASEFIRE BUT JOINED ON BATTLEFIELD WITH TWO GOVERNMENTS
THAT HAD NOT. SHARAF PLEDGED THAT JORDAN WOULD WORK TO BRING
ABOUT REASONABLE COMMON POSITION AMONG ARABS, BUT EMPHASIZED
AGAIN NEED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF US INTENTIONS IN ORDER ACHIEVE
THIS.
SCALI

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Department of State

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ORIGIN SS-20

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 L-03 IO-14 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25

NEA-10 RSC-01 OMB-01 ACDA-19 SSU-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00

INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 PRS-01 SPC-03 USSS-00 /169 R

DRAFTED BY S/S:TRPICKERING:AL

APPROVED BY S/S:TRPICKERING

IO - MR. POPPER

THE SECRETARY (SUBSTANCE)

056523

Z 231817Z OCT 73 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NY FLASH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 209020

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UGEN

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST

1. TEXT FOLLOWS RESOLUTION WORKED OUT HERE WITH SOVIET
CHARGE VORONTSOV FOR THIS AFTERNOON'S SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

BEGIN TEXT

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION
338 OF OCTOBER 22, 1973

1. CONFIRMS ITS DECISION ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION
OF ALL KINDS OF FIRING AND OF ALL MILITARY ACTIONS AND
URGES THAT THE FORCES OF THE TWO-SIDES BE RETURNED TO THE
POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED AT THE MOMENT THE CEASEFIRE
BECAME EFFECTIVE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

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2. SUGGESTS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE DISPATCHING OF UN OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE THE OBSERVATION OF THE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT USING FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FIRST OF ALL THE PERSONNEL NOW IN CAIRO. END TEXT

2. IN THIS FORM YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO COSPONSOR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

UAV
X United Nations
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 USUN N 04150 240214Z

01
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 ACDA-19 USIE-00 INRE-00
SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11
RSC-01 DRC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 /169 W
----- 059831

O 240136Z OCT 73 ZFF-6
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0438
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS USUN 4150

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF
SUBJ: SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING ME CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ME RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY SC
AFTERNOON OCT 23 BY VOTE OF 14-0-0, CHINA NOT
PARTICIPATING

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION 338 (1973) OF 22 OCT 1973,

1. CONFIRMS ITS DECISION ON AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION
OF ALL KINDS OF FIRING AND OF ALL MILITARY ACTION, AND URGES
THAT THE FORCES BE RETURNED TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED
AT THE MOMENT THE CEASEFIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE;

Oct 23 UNSC
Resolution

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 04150 240214Z

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE MEASURES
FOR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO
SUPERVISE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE
FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, USING
FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOW
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FIRST OF ALL THE PERSONNEL NOW IN
CAIRO.
SCALI

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 181

PAGE 01 USUN N 04149 240239Z

67

ACTION IO=14

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 NEA=10 ISO=00 SSO=00 CCO=00 NSCE=00

INRE=00 USSS=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03 INR=10

L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20

USTIA=15 ACDA=19 MC=02 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 DRC=01 /186 W
***** 059902

R 240136Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0437
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

UNCLAS USUN 4149

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF

SUBJ: US STATEMENT ON SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING ME
CEASEFIRE

*Scali's 10/23
statement*

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMB SCALI'S STATEMENT TO
SC OCT 23 AFTER COUNCIL'S ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING ME CEASEFIRE (SEPTEL):

MR. PRESIDENT, I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT ON RECORD MY DELEGATION'S
DEEP REGRET THAT OUR PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED BY
UNFORTUNATE DISORDER. I WISH ALSO TO COMPLIMENT OUR DISTINGUISHED
PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR MCINTYRE, FOR HIS PATIENT EFFORTS TO MAIN-
TAIN AND RESTORE ORDER IN THE CHAMBER. THIS WRANGLE WAS PAR-
TICULARLY REGRETTABLE BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE ISSUE BEFORE US.
THE ISSUE IS PEACE AND WHILE WE SPEAK MEN ARE D'ING.

UNCLASSIFIED
3



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 04149 240239Z

MY DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, WAS PREPARED TO ALLOW THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO SPEAK. WE DID NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD SPEAK AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND WE FERVENTLY HOPE THAT WE MAY BE SPARED FURTHER INTERRUPTIONS IN THE FUTURE.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS JOINED WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN INTRODUCING THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN THAT THE CEASE FIRE ORDERED BY THE COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 22 BE MADE FULLY EFFECTIVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

THERE HAVE BEEN CHARGES FROM EACH SIDE OF VIOLATIONS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE OTHER. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS MOMENT TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY OF THESE CHARGES. NO THIRD PARTY EVIDENCE FROM AN OBJECTIVE SOURCE IS AVAILABLE TO US.

THE RESOLUTION BEFORE US CONFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S DECISION OF OCTOBER 22 ON AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL KINDS OF FIRING AND OF ALL MILITARY ACTION AND URGES THAT THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES BE RETURNED TO THE POSITION THEY OCCUPIED AT THE MOMENT THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. THE RESOLUTION ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TAKE MEASURES TO DISPATCH UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS IMMEDIATELY TO SUPERVISE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE, INCLUDING PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE IN CAIRO.

WE CONSIDER THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION TO BE THOSE IN WHICH THE COUNCIL CONFIRMS ITS POSITION FOR A CEASE FIRE AND IN WHICH IT PROVIDES FOR THE STATIONING OF OBSERVERS BETWEEN THE FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT. THE FORMER PROVISION WILL PUT AN END TO BLOODSHED; THE LATTER WILL RESULT IN THE CREATION OF A CLEAR LINE OF DEMARCATION SEPARATING THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.

WE HAVE AGREED, FOR REASONS OF PRINCIPLE, WITH THE PROVISION OF THE RESOLUTION URGING THE FORCES TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED WHEN THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. WE PUT FORWARD THE PRINCIPLE OF RETURN TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT IN A STATEMENT I MADE IN THIS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 USUN N 04149 240239Z

CHAMBER ON OCTOBER 8. AT THAT TIME THE PRINCIPLES DID NOT RECEIVE THE SUPPORT FROM THE COUNCIL. CONSISTENT WITH OUR ARGUMENT AT THAT TIME, WE AGREE TODAY THAT FORCES SHOULD RETURN TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED AT THE TIME THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. BUT WE MUST POINT OUT THAT THERE WILL BE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING ACTUAL CEASE FIRE LINES AND IN FIXING THE POSITIONS OF FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN MANEUVERING IN THE DESERT. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOT BECOME OUR CENTRAL PREOCCUPATION AS WE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS RESUME AT ONCE THE FUNCTION OF OBSERVATION OF THE FORCES OF THE PARTIES. FORTUNATELY, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS IN THE AREA OFFICERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, WHO CAN PROCEED QUICKLY TO THE CEASE FIRE AREA. ON THE PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION, WE WOULD EXPECT THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, TO PUT OBSERVERS IN PLACE AT ONCE, AND TO RECEIVE IMMEDIATELY REPORTS FROM THEM ON EVENTS IN THE AREAS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THESE REPORTS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FORTHWITH.

FINALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WE MUST LOOK TO THE FUTURE. OUR PARAMOUNT TASK IS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AND TO HALT THE BLOODSHED. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN GIVE PROMPT CONSIDERATION TO THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RESOLUTION, AS IT HAS, SO THAT THE FIGHTING MAY BE STOPPED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN LOOKING TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

SCAL

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 779

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12357 231441Z

53

ACTION NEA=12

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 EUR=25 AF=10 IO=14 CCO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00

USIE=00 INRE=00 USSS=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03

INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03

SS=20 ACDA=19 OMB=01 ORM=03 SR=02 DRC=01 /150 W
054503

R 231222Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4857

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 12357

E.O. 11652: NGDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, MOPS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL LEBANESE VIEW RE ME PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

1. AMBASSADOR MET WITH FONMIN NAFFA OCT 23 AT LATTER'S REQUEST. NAFFA PRESENTED AIDE-MEMOIRE (TEXT BELOW) WHICH GOL PRESENTING IN IDENTICAL FORM TO ALL PERMANENT SC MEMBERS. (DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.)

BEGIN TEXT: THE LEBANESE GOVT DOES NOT AT PRESENT POSSESS SUFFICIENT DETAILS ON THE TALKS WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE FORMULATION OF RESOLUTION 338 ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 22, 1973. NEVERTHELESS, IT BELIEVES IT NECESSARY FROM THE OUTSET TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT:

1. LEBANON, NOT HAVING TAKEN PART EITHER IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1967 OR IN THOSE OF OCTOBER 1973, CONSIDERS THAT RESOLUTION 242, AS WELL AS RESOLUTION 338--AT LEAST IN ITS FIRST PARAGRAPH--DOES NOT PERTAIN TO IT DIRECTLY. IT RECALLS THAT THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT WHICH GOVERNS ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IS THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION CONCLUDED IN 1949.

2. IN ANY CASE, LEBANON INTERPRETS RESOLUTION 242, CON-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12357 231441Z

FIRMED BY RESOLUTION 338, AS PROPERLY FORBIDDING THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND REQUIRING, THEREFORE, THE WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE JUNE 1967.

3. LEBANON DEPLORES THE FACT THAT RESOLUTION 242 RELATES ONLY TO "A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM", SINCE THE REAL PROBLEM AT ISSUE IS NOT A REFUGEE PROBLEM, BUT A POLITICAL AND NATIONAL PROBLEM: THAT OF THE FREE DETERMINATION OF THE DESTINY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT ALSO DEPLORES THE FACT THAT RESOLUTION 338 WAS SILENT ON THIS SUBJECT, DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS THE ORIGIN OF THE MIDEAST CONFLICT. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF THIS PROBLEM IS NOT SETTLED IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER, THE SEARCH FOR A "JUST AND LASTING PEACE" ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 338 WILL BE IN VAIN. FOR THIS REASON, THE LEBANESE GOVT MOST PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THIS PROBLEM IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DECIDED BY PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 338.

4. LEBANON DESIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. ALTHOUGH HAVING NO TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WITH ANYONE, IT FORESEES THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DECIDED UPON BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, CERTAIN PROBLEMS WHICH CONCERN IT EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WILL CERTAINLY BE RAISED. IT HENCEFORTH RESERVES ITS RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE STUDY AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THOSE PROBLEMS. END TEXT.

2. ABOVE IS FREE TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH. ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO DEPT. BUFFUM

CONFIDENTIAL



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War
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 398

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 06050 232003Z

70

ACTION EUR=25

INFO OCT=01 NEA=10 IO=14 ISO=00 EURE=00 CCO=00 INRE=00

NSCE=00 SSO=00 USIE=00 USSS=00 AF=10 CIAE=00 DODE=00

PM=07 H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01

PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20 ACDA=19 MC=02 NIC=01 SAJ=01 EB=11

DRC=01 /157 W

057334

O R 231900Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8966
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 6050

DEPT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EC XF BE UN
SUBJ: EC-9 POSITION ON UNSC RESOLUTION

REF: BRUSSELS 6021

1. FONOFF SOURCE (PROTECT) IN STRICT CONFIDENCE PROVIDED
EMBOFF WITH FOLLOWING TEXT OF PROPOSED NEW EC-9 DECLARATION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 06050 232043Z

ON MIDDLE EAST WORKED OUT BY MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS IN LONDON
OCT 22 (REPTTEL).

"A. THE NINE GOVERNMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
CORDIALLY WELCOME SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 338
ADOPTED TODAY. THEY ENDORSE ITS CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE
CEASE-FIRE AND THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS AS WELL AS
ITS DECISION THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START IMMEDIATELY AND
CONCURRENTLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE PARTIES CON-
CERNED UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES AIMED AT A JUST AND
DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

"B. THEY URGE THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO IMPLEMENT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 338 WITHOUT DELAY.

"C. THEY REGARD THIS NEW RESOLUTION AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO
BRING A PERMANENT AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE TO THE MIDDLE
EAST AREA, AND THEY DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO DO ALL IN
THEIR POWER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESSES OF PEACE-MAKING
AND PEACE-KEEPING.

"D. THE CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE NINE
GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE."

3. CONTRARY TO DAVIGNON'S ASSURANCE THAT EC -9 WOULD ISSUE
STATEMENT EVENING OF OCTOBER 22, SOURCE SAID DECLARATION
WAS TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN COPENHAGEN AT 1:00 PM OCT 23.
SINCE IT WAS NOT ISSUED HE ASSUMED THERE WAS SNAG AFTER DRAFT
REFERRED TO SEVEN OF EC-9 CAPITALS. (SOURCE SAID BELGIAN AND
BRITISH DELEGATES ACCEPTED TEXT WITHOUT REFERRAL.)

[3. PROBLEM MAY HAVE DEVELOPED OVER OMISSION FROM DRAFT OF
REFERENCE TO ARMS DELIVERIES. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, FRENCH
SUGGESTED THAT DECLARATION INCLUDE CALL FOR TERMINATION OF
"PASSIVE ARMS DELIVERIES." BELGIA'S AND GERMANS ACCEPTED
PROPOSAL. BRITISH SAID THEY COULD ACCEPT IF "EMERGENCY"
INSERTED BEFORE "MASSIVE". (THIS RECOMMENDED AMENDMENT
SAID TO HAVE COME STRAIGHT FROM FONMIN DOUGLAS-HOME.) WHEN
FRENCH PROPOSAL NOT ACCEPTED BY WHOLE GROUP, FRENCH DELEGATE
COMMENTED THAT OMISSION MIGHT MEAN GOF NOT ABLE TO CONCUR
IN DECLARATION. STRAUSS-HUPE

NOTE BY CC/T: NOT PASSED USENT CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

WAR
TELEGRAM

23 OCT

SECRET 407

FILE COPY

3

PAGE 01 BONN 15316 231752Z

02
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

R 231747Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8230

SECRET BONN 15316

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI

SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF MILITARY MATERIAL TO ISRAEL

1. EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT SINCE OCT 18 WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE AND EUCOM FACILITATING THE SHIPMENT OF 75,000 RDS 105 MM AMMO, 65 M60 TANKS, 23 105 MM HOWITZERS, AND 55 TOW WEAPONS. WE ALSO RECEIVED A EUCOM MESSAGE OCT 23 REQUESTING ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SHIP 200 M54 TRUCKS.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE SHIPMENT OF TANKS, AMMO AND ARTILLERY, THREE ISRAELI VESSELS, THE GALIDA, NARKIS, AND PALMAL WERE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE OCT 22, OCT 23, AND OCT 25 RESPECTIVELY. TANKS AND HOWITZERS ARE NOW BEING LOADED AND WE FORESEE NO PROBLEMS CONCERNING THEIR SHIPMENT. WE ARE INFORMED HOWEVER THAT BECAUSE OF FRG NAVY REQUIREMENTS AMMO LOADING WILL PROBABLY BE DELAYED AT NORDENHAM. (AMMO LOADING IS NORMALLY PERFORMED AT NORDENHAM AND NOT IN BREMERHAVEN.) THE OPERATION IS BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FRG REQUEST THAT SHIPMENTS NOT ARRIVE AT THE PORTS MORE THAN 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF LOADING IN ORDER TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE ON THEM.

3. WE CONTACTED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY THE MORNING OF OCT 23.

056209

ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELD
V. I. G.
VALSH



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 15316 231752Z

REQUESTING THAT IT ARRANGE FOR ADDITIONAL SHIPPING TO
MOVE THE 200 M54 TRUCKS. WE ARE AWAITING INFO FROM THE
ISRAELI EMBASSY WHEN THEIR SHIPS WILL CALL FOR LOADING.

4. FINALLY, USAFE AIRLIFTED 55 TOW WEAPONS FROM RAMSTEIN
AB ON OCT 16.
HILLENBRAND

SECRET

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War
TELEGRAM

230A

UNCLASSIFIED 484

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08527 232045Z

64

ACTION NEA=12

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 ISO=00 IO=14 SSO=00 NSCE=00 USIE=00

INRE=00 CCO=00 USSS=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03

INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03

SS=20 ACDA=19 AID=20 OMB=01 DRC=01 /155 W
===== 057600

O 232018Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 246
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 8527

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: PRIMIN MEIR STATEMENT ON CEASEFIRE

1. MRS MEIR ADDRESSED KNESSET TUESDAY EVENING OCT 23 ON GOI'S
ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE (ASSUME FBIS TEXT AVAILABLE). MAIN
POINTS DRAWN FROM GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN ARE AS
FOLLOWS

2. MRS MEIR SAID THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASEFIRE IS CONDITIONAL
ON RECIPROCITY. SHE NOTED THAT FIGHTING WAS CONTINUING
AGAINST EGYPT AND WARNED SEVERAL TIMES THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE
WHATEVER ACTION IT CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH SITUATION.
SHE ALSO NOTED THAT ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE WITH
EGYPT WAS CONDITIONAL UPON EGYPT'S AGREEMENT, BUT WAS NOT

Meir Speech

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08527 232045Z

CONDITIONAL UPON SYRIA'S AGREEMENT TO A CEASEFIRE. FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE, SHE SAID, ON SYRIAN FRONT.

3. PRIMIN STRESSED THAT GOI ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. SHE SAID THAT "THE LINES WE HOLD TODAY ON THE SYRIAN FRONT ARE BETTER THAN THOSE WE HELD ON OCTOBER 6." BY CROSSING TO WEST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL, SHE SAID IDF HAD PUT ITSELF IN POSITION WHICH OFFERED A NUMBER OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE POSSIBILITIES.

4. REGARDING US POSITION, SHE SAID THAT AS RESULT OF CONTACTS WITH USG, "NOT ONLY DOES THE US HAVE NO PLAN FOR THE BORDERS AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF PEACE, BUT IT IS ITS (US) VIEW THAT THOSE WHO OFFER THEIR 'GOOD SERVICES' SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES - AND THEY ALONE - SHOULD MAKE PROPOSALS."

REGARDING MOSCOW TALKS, SHE SAID "I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTHORITYATIVE INFORMATION, THE MOSCOW TALKS CONTAINED NOTHING MORE THAN IS CONTAINED IN THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION." SHE ALSO NOTED THAT US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAD BEEN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN GOI'S DECISION TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE.

5. SHE EMPHASIZED LINKAGE BETWEEN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF SC RESOLUTION BUT LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON IMMEDIATE AND CONCURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. NEGOTIATIONS, SHE SAID, MEANT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND US AGREED WITH GOI ON THIS POINT.

6. FINALLY, MRS MEIR TOOK NOTE OF CONTINUING TERRORIST ATTACKS FROM LEBANON AND SAID THAT IDF WAS FULLY ALERT

THIS SITUATION.
KEATING

UNCLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

TELEGRAM

23 Oct

SECRET 903

PAGE 01 STATE 208918

50
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

66602
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY: S/S-TRPICKERING
NEA:MR. SISCO

O 231540Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 208918

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINE

REF: AMMAN 5652

PLEASE INFORM THE KING THAT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF ANY KIND IN MOSCOW REGARDING PALESTINE. KISSINGER

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

D/G

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30

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

⑤

3

1031 R

055153

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
Y. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

0/0

F.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: UGEN, PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

1. YOU SHOULD TELL KING THAT WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH SOVIETS
ON THIS MATTER. KISSINGER

Synopsis minutely
accepted lease
for rate
10/23

30

SEX DISSEX



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 197

5

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05659 231827Z

3

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

1031 W

056482

O 231824Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9822

S E C R E T AMMAN 5659

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS=1
TAGS: OGEN, PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

REF: STATE 208919

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

KING WAS APPRECIATIVE OF CONTENTS REFTEL. HE HAS
DELEGATION ON WAY TO CAIRO TO FIND OUT WHAT IS UP. WHEN IT
RETURNS TONIGHT, WILL SEND ANOTHER TO DAMASCUS. ALL IS COOL
ON SYRIAN FRONT. HE PLAN TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.
BROWN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

War

SECRET/EXDIS

(3)
S-I
S-M
S-S
PC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #56

A Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, Oct. 23
1973

R Military Situation

/N
PRS
WLG

R
(LDX)
D (LDX)
A (LDX)
A (LDX)
/HO

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During the morning of October 23 an IDF spokesman announced that, as a consequence of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire in the southern sector of the Suez area, the IDF was ordered to continue fighting in this sector. Tel Aviv claims that the Egyptians began shelling Israeli positions near Ismailia about one hour after the cease-fire deadline had passed. The Israelis report many clashes between Egyptian and Israeli forces on the Suez front during the night. Cairo denies Israeli claims that the Egyptians violated the cease-fire and asserts that these reports are fabrications in order to give the Israelis a pretext to resume the hostilities. There are conflicting reports on the situation on the Syrian front, but fighting was reported to have continued past the cease-fire deadline.

According to one report, the Syrians launched a vigorous counterattack against Mt. Hermon which they lost during the previous day. The Israelis claim they now control the top of Mt. Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh) and that they hold 350 square miles of Syrian territory in addition to the territory they occupied in 1967.

The IDF reports an increase in terrorist activities in the northern sector and that mortar, katyusha rocket and bazooka fire was directed toward Israeli settlements. The Israelis conducted air and artillery strikes against terrorist targets in the area opposite Mt. Hermon in Lebanon.

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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Cease-fire

According to our latest information, the following countries have officially accepted the cease-fire resolution: Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

The following have officially rejected the cease-fire resolution: Iraq, Libya and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. There has been no official reaction from the following states: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria. Privately, Lebanese officials have approved of the cease-fire.

Syrian Front and Jordanians

Hussein informed Ambassador Brown in Amman that a combined Arab offensive scheduled for October 23 on the Syrian front had been called off, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the King to commit his forces. However, the IDF still expects an attack on the Golan Heights area and have reports that the Syrians are moving SA-6s to the front.

In a further effort to prevent Jordanian Army units in Syria from participating in any further clashes with the Israelis since the announcement of the cease-fire, Secretary Kissinger sent a message to King Hussein. In that message the Secretary stated we hope Jordan has accepted the cease-fire with regard to its forces everywhere, and that it would be tragic if Jordan should be in violation of the cease-fire.

Secretary's Return

The Secretary and his party returned to Washington (Andrews Air Force Base) at 2:15 A.M. on October 23. Upon their arrival Mr. McCloskey, the Department spokesman, made the following statement: "We believe that one matter that should take priority is that of exchange of prisoners. We and the Soviet Union have pledged our efforts to assure that this takes place."

Israeli Politics


Prime Minister Golda Meir is scheduled to make a statement to the Knesset at 10:00 A.M. (EDT) on October 23 about the Israeli government's decision to accept the cease-fire. A debate will follow the Prime Minister's statement. The right of center "Likud" Opposition

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Alliance, which is based on the Gahal Party, already has criticized the Israeli government's decision to accept the UN's call for a cease-fire and Israeli acceptance of any proposal referring to UN Resolution 242. This Alliance, which is opposed to any withdrawal from the 1967 cease-fire lines, also accused the government of making a great mistake before the October 6 war broke out by failing to mobilize the nation's reserves to ward off the Arab attack.



SECRET/EXDIS

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A/WLG
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DOD (LDX)
CIA (LDX)
NSA (LDX)
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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 57

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, 10/23/73

Egypt has called for a Security Council meeting, claiming the Israelis have violated the ceasefire and are seeking to enlarge their bridgehead on the west bank of the Canal. The meeting, scheduled for 1200 EDT, has been delayed to give time for missions to receive their instructions.

Military Situation

Fighting has resumed along the Israeli bulge in the west bank of the Suez Canal although there are conflicting reports as to the level. According to an IDF spokesman, the Egyptians advanced eastward in the northern sector although there were no reports of firing. The central sector was reported quiet. In the southern sector, an Egyptian artillery barrage was followed by an armor attack on Israeli positions from the west and south. In earlier reports, IDF spokesman claimed there was artillery fire along the entire front.

According to Egyptian sources, Israel pushed enormous quantities of equipment across the Canal during the night near Ismailia and the Great Bitter Lake and succeeded in considerably strengthening its position on the west bank. Egypt claims Israeli planes bombed Egyptian positions west of the Suez Canal in violation of the ceasefire.

On the Syrian front there was heavy fighting in the area of Mt. Hermon. Numerous Syrian troops have reportedly entered Lebanon to avoid capture. A large air battle took place near Damascus in the morning of October 23. Syria claims 60 Israeli aircraft were involved of which 11 were

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shot down. The IDF said 10 Syrian planes were downed.

Soviet Resupply

Approximately 60 Soviet missions were flown October 22 raising the level of resupply missions to 800 since the Soviet airlift began on October 10. Approximately 10,000 short tons of materiel have been airlifted to the Arabs since the conflict began. On October 20 a Yugoslav ship reportedly unloaded over 800 tons of military equipment at the port of Tripoli, Lebanon, including an unknown number of tanks.

Estimated Casualties

DIA estimates casualties are as follows through October 22:

	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Israel</u>
Personnel (KIA/WIA)	15,700	4,150
Tanks	1,950	875
Aircraft	412	119
Ships	30	1

During briefing for the Secretary when in Tel Aviv, the Chief of the IAF listed Israel's aircraft losses at 104. The most critical factor at this time is not aircraft but aircrews. The Israelis now have only 69-70 F-4 crews.

Ethiopia Cuts Diplomatic Relations with Israel

Ethiopia announced today that it is severing relations with Israel. Ethiopia's announcement is in accordance with Boumedienne's call to all African states to break relations with Israel.

Reaction to UNSC Ceasefire Resolution 338

On the front, Egyptian troops at all levels reportedly were bitter at Sadat's decision to conclude a ceasefire. Newsweek editor de Borchgrave reports having witnessed a mutiny among Egyptian troops in Kantara lasting 45 minutes in protest at Sadat's decision to conclude a ceasefire.

In Cairo Al Ahram reports that when Sadat received the U.S./Soviet draft and accepted the ceasefire, it was

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based on "full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied lands" and safeguarding of legitimate Palestinian rights. Al Ahram commented favorably that the undertaking by the superpowers of a special commitment to implement a ceasefire is a stand which neither the U.S. nor Israel had ever before accepted.

In Israel, the rightwing Likud opposition alliance has issued a declaration stating that the implementation of the UNSC resolution will not lead to peace but will endanger Israel's security. At the Knesset session scheduled to begin 10:00 a.m. EDT today, a vote may be taken on the GOI decision to accept the ceasefire resolution. Embassy Tel Aviv estimates the GOI will win the Knesset vote by only a small margin and the labor alignment will be in for some rough sledding in the weeks ahead.

In accordance with Libya's refusal to accept the ceasefire resolution, about 1,250 students picketed our Embassy in Tripoli in protest of the resolution.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

054238

0 231300Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5280
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
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ANDERSON _____
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LEHMAN _____
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WALSH _____

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 4672

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, XF

SUBJECT: CEASE-FIRE HELPFUL BUT FULL IMPLEMENTATION
SC 242 ONLY SOLUTION TO END OIL EMBARGO

REF JIDDA 4653

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUMMARY: ARAMCO PRESIDENT, IN TELEGRAM TO NEW YORK ABOUT OCT 22 MEETING WITH SAG MINPET YAMANI, BELIEVES SAG IS PREPARED TO RESORT TO FURTHER USE OF OIL WEAPON--FOLLOWING OIL CUTOFF TO U.S.--LONG AS SC 242 IS NOT FULLY RPT FULLY IMPLEMENTED. ASSURANCE BY OTHER MINISTRIES IN SAG TO US DEFENSE CONTRACTORS THAT THEY CAN CONTINUE THEIR WORK HERE REFLECTS THEIR REALISTIC NEED TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. SOURCES OF SUPPLY/TRAINING BUT WILL NOT CHANGE SAG APPROACH ON OIL FRONT. FOLLOW-THROUGH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 1967 RESOLUTION WILL BE ONLY WAY SAG WILL BE PERSUADED LIFT PRODUCTION AND EMBARGO RESTRICTIONS, IN OPINION OF ARAMCO. EMBASSY REQUESTS SOURCE BE PROTECTED AND THAT OUR POSSESSION OF TELEGRAM NOT RPT NOT BE REVEALED TO PARENT COMPANIES UNLESS THEY INDICATE THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD BY ARAMCO COPY GIVEN TO EMBASSY. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING TELEGRAM SENT BY PRESIDENT JUNGERS TO JOHNSTON OF EXXON HAS BEEN RELAYED CONFIDENTIALLY TO EMBASSY. DEPARTMENT PLEASE OBSERVE ABOVE STRICTURES.

QUOTE ON REFLECTION I FELT THE REFERENCED CABLE NEEDED FURTHER COMMENTARY TO THAT YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF SAG'S POSITION. FIRST OF ALL THE MEETING ITSELF WAS A VERY FORMAL ONE IN STRUCTURE. YAMANI AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE RANGED AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE WITH THEM ON ONE SIDE AND US ON THE OTHER, WITH YAMANI AT THE HEAD. THIS WAS APPARENTLY DONE DELIBERATELY TO IMPRESS UPON US THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS QUITE HEAVY AND AS IT WAS POINTED OUT IN THE REFERENCED CABLE ALL OF THE SAUDIS, PARTICULARLY AMIR SADU, WERE GLUM AND DISILLUSIONED.

QUOTE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION WAS QUICKLY BROUGHT TO ME BY THE STRICTNESS OF THE INTERPRDTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES AND BY THE SAG PARTICIPANTS ATTITUDE THAT THE GREATER THE DAMAGE THIS DOES TO THE USA AND THE MORE IMMEDIATE DIRECT OR INDIRECT PRESSURE IT CREATES FOR USA THE BETTER IT WILL BE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN DISCUSSING EXEMPT COUNTRIES YAMANI SPECIFICALLY REMARKED IT WAS INTENDED THAT THESE CUTS BE FELT IN JAPAN AND ITALY. SINCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ITALY SUPPLIES FUEL OIL TO THE UNITED STATES IT WOULD BE AN OBVIOUS TARGET. HE ALSO STATED THAT NETHERLANDS MIGHT WELL REACH THE TOTAL EMBARGO LIST.

QUOTE IT WAS AT THIS MEETING THAT WE LEARNED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE EMBARGO TO THE USA WAS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADDITIONAL REDUCTION IN TOTAL PRODUCTION. THE SAUDIS WERE NOT CONTENT TO LEAVE ANY LOOPHOLES FOR USA AND THUS QUICKLY WENT TO THE WESTERN AND BAHRAIN TRANSHIPMENT POINTS AS EMBARGOED DESTINATIONS ALSO AS WELL AS MILITARY DELIVERIES. THE SAUDIS WERE NOT CONTENT WITH THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO ONLY BUT ARE TAKING MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF STOPPING THE FLOW OF OIL TO USA FROM ALL POINTS POSSIBLE.

QUOTE DESPITE THE GARVITY OF THIS SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES SAG APPEARED TO HAVE NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN TRUSTING ARAMCO TO ENFORCE THE RULES ONCE EXPLAINED. YAMANI SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO EVEN WRITE THE RULES DOWN IN A LETTER TO US UNLESS WE SO DESIRED. WE ASKED HIM TO GIVE US A WRITE-UP WHICH HE THEN ASKED SAGQA TO DO.

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

NSAE-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

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O 231300Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

QUOTE IT WAS ALSO VERY CLEAR IN THIS MEETING THAT IF
THESE MEASURES DID NOT PRODUCE RESULTS THE SAUDIS HAVE
OTHER AND DIFFERENC MEASURE IN STORE. YAMANI SAID IT
WOULD NOT JUST BE MORE OF THE SAME. COMPLETE NATIONALI-
ZATION OF ARAMCO IS NO DOUBT ON THE LIST OF OTHER MEASURES
THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE IN MIND AND THIS IS PROBABLY VERY
CLOSE TO THE TOP OF THE LIST OF NEXT STEPS. WE CAN NO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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LONGER TAKE COMFORT FROM THE PAST POSITION OF SAG THAT NATIONALIZATION WAS NOT ITS POLICY, JUST AS WE COULD TAKE NO COMFORT FROM STATEMENTS PRIOR TO THIS CRISIS THAT USE OF OIL AS A WEAPON WAS NOT SAG'S POLICY. EVENTS HAVE OVERTAKEN US SO RAPIDLY THAT IT WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR TO ATTEMPT TO APPLY ANY OF THE PAST POLICY STATEMENTS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE SURVIVAL OF THE SAUDI REGIME IS NOW AT STAKE IN PRESSURING THE UNITED STATES TO CHANGE ITS PRO-ISRAEL STANCE. HAVING USED THE OIL WEAPON THE SAUDIS ARE COMMITTED TO FOLLOW WITH ANY OTHER WEAPON AVAILABLE UNTIL THE RESULT IS ATTAINED. OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IRAQ AND SYRIA HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON SAG TO GO EVEN FURTHER. IRAQI RADIO STATIONS HAVE ATTACKED SAG FOR NOT USING THE OIL WEAPON EFFECTIVELY. IRAQ APPARENTLY MADE A THREE POINT PROPOSAL AT KUWAIT, NAMELY (1) LIQUIDATION OF ALL AMERICAN INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY OIL, BY NATIONALIZATION, (2) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARAB FUNDS FROM USA AND (3) SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC AND ALL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH USA. INASMUCH AS SAG BLOCKED THEIR PROPOSALS IRAQ DID NOT SIGN AND IN FACT DID NOT EVEN ATTEND FINAL MEETING. ALL THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT WILL BE A FORE-RUNNER OF THINGS TO COME IF PRESENT OIL BOYCOTT MEASURES ARE NOT DEEMED EFFECTIVE.

QUOTE THE IRAQI PRESS AND RADIO HAVE BEEN CARRYING ON A VICIOUS AND CONCENTRATED ATTACK ON THE SAUDI REGIME WITH ACCUSATIONS OF TREASON, PROTECTION OF USA INTERESTS, AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT. THE SYRIAN OIL MINISTER ISSUED A DIPLOMATICALLY-COUCHEE STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SYRIANS HAD HOPED THAT ACTION ON THE OIL FRONT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DECISIVE. LEFTIST AND NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE BEGINNING TO ECHO THE IRAQI CALL FOR NATIONALIZATION ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEM HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM OPEN ATTACKS ON SAUDI ARABIA, AND THESE RESTRAINTS, CAUSED BY THE WAR, ARE NOT LIKELY TO PERSIST AFTER A CEASE-FIRE.

QUOTE YAMANI HAS IN THE PAST ENCOURAGED THE OTHER SHAREHOLDERS TO COME UP WITH SOME NEW INGENIOUS WAY OF HANDLING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMPANIES AND THE GOVERN-

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TELEGRAM

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
MENT THAT WOULD SOLVE THE 51 PERCENT PROBLEM RAISED BY LIBYA AND AT ISSUE IN KUWAIT. YAMANI MENTIONED THIS SAME THING TO AKINS LAST FRIDAY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE 51 PERCENT IS A SORE POINT. AS YAMANI HAS SAID SEPARATELY TO BOTH ME AND AKINS, IF THE COMPANIES HAD OFFERED 51 PERCENT BEFORE LIBYA MOVED IN WITH THIS DEMAND HE COULD HAVE STOOD PAT BUT NOW SOMETHING ELSE WILL HAVE TO BE ARRANGED.

QUOTE A POLITICAL ACT OF NATIONALIZATION WOULD NOT ONLY BE A BLOW AT USA INTERESTS BUT WOULD BE A METHOD OF SOLVING THIS OTHER PROBLEM THAT YAMANI HAS IN MIND.

TE THERE ARE PROBABLY REPORTS COMING OUT OF SAUDI ARABIA THAT ARE NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THIS ONE AS WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEFENSE CONTRACTORS ARE BEING ENCOURAGED TO STAY ON THEIR JOBS OF ASSISTING THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES AND ARE BEING TOLD NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THESE POLITICAL MOVES. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BE INFLUENCED BY THESE MORE OPTIMISTIC REPORTS. MOTIVE BEHIND SAUDI ASSURANCES TO DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IS TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVENESS OF SAUDI ARMED FORCES, WHICH HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THEM, AND TO DO THIS THEY MUST TAKE RELATIVELY PRO-USA STAND IN THIS ONE RESTRICTED AREA. THIS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CARRY OVER INTO FAR WIDER FIELD OF OIL SUPPLY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, KIND WORDS TO DEFENSE CONTRACTORS DO NOT SIMPLY ANY SOFTENING OF SAUDI POSITION TOWARDS USG ITSELF.

QUOTE WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED NEWS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE THIS EVENING AND OTHER MEASURES. THIS IS AN ENCOURAGING MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT WE SHOULD GUARD AGAINST UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM, PARTICULARLY AGAINST EXPECTING AN EARLY LIFTING OF THE PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY RESTRICTIONS. A CEASE-FIRE, EVEN IF ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES, WOULD BE RELATIVELY MEANINGLESS. WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED IS SOME FOLLOW-THROUGH AND IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ENTIRE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION (WHICH IN TURN REQUIRES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1967 RESOLUTION). ONLY THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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TO RADICALS THAT SAUDI USE OF THE OIL WEAPON HAD BEEN
SUCCESSFUL IN PART AT LEAST AND THUS ENABLE SAG NOT TO
IMPOSE ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS. JUNGERS. END QUOTE.

2. COMMENT: OPINION GIVEN IN THIS TELEGRAM TO PARENT
COMPANIES APPEARS TO BE BORNE OUT BY CONTACTS OF EMBASSY
REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS WITH OFFICIALS IN RIYADH.
ONLY GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBLE FINAL STEELEMENT
HAS BEEN REGISTERED WITH US.
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CIA (LDX)

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SCI

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 58

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT 10/23

Diplomatic - UNSC

The UNSC convened late this afternoon and a joint US/USSR resolution was tabled calling for the implementation of Resolution 338. The Council debate on the resolution was continuing as of 1800 today.

Military Situation

The situation on the Syrian front remains essentially unchanged since the noon Sitrep. The Israeli military spokesman noted to USDAO Tel Aviv a sharp reduction in Soviet AN-12 flights to Syria today - only 8.

Press reports from Tel Aviv indicate that the non-observance of the ceasefire continued, with the principal military activity on the Egyptian front taking place in the southern Suez sector. Israel claimed to have downed 10 Egyptian planes today, and for the first time to have encountered Libyan piloted Mirage 3s. Egypt reported downing 7 Israeli planes and reported heavy military activity East and West of the Canal.

Meir Speech

Prime Minister Meir in a Knesset address, summarized Israel's diplomatic and military situation and presented the Government's rationale for accepting the ceasefire. She placed special emphasis on the US/Israel relationship and our role in Israel's resupply as factors that moved Israel to accept the ceasefire. She

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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-2-

also warned the Arab leaders to observe the ceasefire or "they will find Israel ready for them."

Soviet Statement

In a short statement issued tonight the USSR blamed Israel for the breakdown of the ceasefire, and warned of "the most grave consequences unless its (Israel's) troops stopped fighting."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

FILE COPY
TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN SS-10

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DRAFTED BY TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM SAM 86970
APPROVED BY S/S-O: REGINA ELTZ

Z 230615Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 208875

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
YAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AIRCRAFT SAM 86970 FOR
FLASH RELAY TO YOU

NOTE

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM SECRETARY

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING FROM
SECRETARY

2. QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST ADVISED ME OF THE PRESSURES
YOU ARE UNDER FOR YOUR UNITS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING ON
THE SYRIAN FRONT.

I AM AT THIS MOMENT IN THE AIR ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON
 TO REPORT PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON MY TALKS IN
 MOSCOW, WHICH ACHIEVED THE RESOLUTION PASSED LAST NIGHT
 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE ACCEPTED
 THE CEASEFIRE. I VERY MUCH HOPE I CAN REPORT TO HIM.

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SECRET

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ANDERSON _____
HOLDBRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
~~KENNEDY~~ _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
~~SCHUBERS~~ _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
VALSH _____



Department of State

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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 208875

THAT JORDAN HAS DONE THE SAME, WITH REGARD TO ITS FORCES
EVERYWHERE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS

UNAMBIGUOUS IN THIS REGARD.

IT WOULD BE TRAGIC, YOUR MAJESTY, AFTER THE
FORTITUDE YOU HAVE SHOWN DURING THESE DIFFICULT WEEKS
IN RESISTING A WIDENING OF THE WAR, IF JORDAN SHOULD
BE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE FOR WHICH WE HAVE
ALL STRIVEN SO HARD.

SINCERELY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE

RUSH



Department of State

FILE *copy*
TELEGRAM

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SECRET 668

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05653 231400Z

44-S
ACTION SS=30

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 CCO=00 SSO=00 /031 W

Z 231344Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9818

SECRET AMMAN 5653

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS=1
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

03
ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
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KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODDEN
R
RONDON
SONNENFELDT
V I G.
VALSH

054234

2/B

1. KING SAID AT 1330 LOCAL THAT HE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SYRIA. SAYS THAT BAATH PARTY AND LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN IN CONTINUAL CONFERENCE FOR PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AND NOTHING HAS COME OUT OF IT YET. HE CONTINUES PUSH FOR OFFICIAL ATTITUDE ON CEASE-FIRE BUT GETS NO RESPONSE. HE WILL SEND A DELEGATION TONIGHT TO DAMASCUS, CARRYING LETTER TO ASSAD. LETTER WILL SAY THAT JORDANIANS WILL WITHDRAW FROM SYRIA UNLESS DECISION FORTHCOMING.

2. KING BELIEVES THAT SYRIANS UNDER PRESSURE FROM IRAQIS AND THAT SYRIAN BAATH PARTY HESITANT TO ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE IN FEAR OF BEING OUTDISTANCED ON LEFT BY IRAQI BAATH. AS TIME GOES ON, HE IS MORE AND MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ASSAD, FEARING THAT HIS EVIDENT INABILITY TO IMPOSE DECISIONS INDICATES HIS WEAKNESS AND PRESAGES POSSIBLE COUP.

3. KING BELIEVES THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT CARRYING OUT THE MOSCOW BARGAIN. HE ASSUMES THAT SOVIETS WERE SUPPOSED TO GET DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD TO AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE. BAGHDAD, WHICH HAS CLOSEST LINKS WITH MOSCOW, IS THE REAL TROUBLE-MARKER.

4. HE SENDS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO SECRETARY QUOTE PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH BREZHNEV AND TELL HIM THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SYRIANS AND IRAQIS ACCEDE TO CEASE-FIRE AND THAT SOVIETS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
35



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05653 231403Z

MUST MAKE THIS POINT STRONGLY IN BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS. UNQUOTE.

5. KING HAS SENT MESSAGE TO SADAT, EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN POSITION AND ASKING SADAT TO DO SOMETHING. HE IS AWAITING A REPLY.
BROWN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

Ubu

~~S. R.~~

10/23

SCOWCROFT
L. L.

SYRIA ACCEPTS
CEASE-FIRE

ZZ
RNR 291
ZCZC NYB059
SS WDA UBA LJP CPD
2055 :CNAP **** MIDEAST SYRIAN:
UNITED NATIONS, OCT. 23, REUTER--SYRIA TONIGHT
ACCEPTED THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR A
CEASEFIRE IN A MESSAGE READ TO THE COUNCIL BY
SECRETARY GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM.
;:REUTER ML/CS/FD

S E C R E T

***** COPY

FLASH
DE RUEHC #8875 2960621
Z 230615Z OCT 73 ZFF
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4990

S F C R E T STATE 208675

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: OVID (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AIRCRAFT SAM 06070 FLR
FLASH RELAY TO YOU

QUOTE

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM SECRETARY

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING FROM
SECRETARY

2. QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST ADVISED ME OF THE PRESSURES
YOU ARE UNDER FOR YOUR UNITS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING ON
THE SYRIAN FRONT.

I AM AT THIS MOMENT IN THE AIR ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON
TO REPORT PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON MY TALKS IN
MOSCOW, WHICH ACHIEVED THE RESOLUTION PASSED LAST NIGHT
BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE ACCEPTED
THE CEASEFIRE. I VERY MUCH HOPE I CAN REPORT TO HIM
THAT JORDAN HAS DONE THE SAME, WITH REGARD TO ITS FORCES
EVERYWHERE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS

UNAMBIGUOUS IN THIS REGARD.

IT WOULD BE TRAGIC, YOUR MAJESTY, AFTER THE
FORTITUDE YOU HAVE SHOWN DURING THESE DIFFICULT WEEKS

***** WISR COMMENT *****

QUANDT

PSN:015182 PAGE 01

TOR:296/06:28Z DTG:230615Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

***** COPY

WAR
230A

S E C R E T

***** COPY

IN RESISTING A WIDENING OF THE WAR, IF JORDAN SHOULD
BE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE FOR WHICH WE HAVE
ALL STRIVEN SO HARD.

SINCERLY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNCLAS

RUSH
BT

PSN:015182 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:296/06:28Z DTG:230615Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

***** COPY

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

OP IMMED
ESA414AAB407
DE RUESKW #0572 2961249
O 231136Z OCT 73 ZFF-6
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0602

INFO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0008
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0067
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0294
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0114
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0009
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0006
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0092
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0056
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0137
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0001
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 0165
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0026
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0004
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0140

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 0572

KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI, Doha, MANAMA, AME MUSCAT
EBD, 1176Z: GDS
TACS: PFOR, XF, US, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S CALL FOR ELIMINATION U.S. INTERESTS

1. SINCE IRAQ HAS LITTLE TO LOSE IT IS IN STRONG POSITION TO CALL FOR CUTTING OF TIES AND ELIMINATION OF ALL U.S. INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD. ALTHOUGH ADDRESSEES AWARE OF THIS FACT, FOLLOWING INFO MAY BE USEFUL.

2. NATIONALIZATION OF EXXON AND MOBIL ON OCT 7 REMOVED LAST SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN IRAQ; NO U.S. AIRCRAFT LAND HERE (ALTHOUGH PANAM OVERFLIES); IRAQ'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS IN DOLLARS OR U.S. BANKS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT; IRAQ EXPORTS ONLY SMALL QUANTITY OIL TO U.S.; AND NO DIPLOMATIC OR OFFICIAL TIES OF SIGNIFICANCE EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. OFFICIAL CONTACTS THAT DO EXIST ARE THROUGH TWO MAN USINT AND FIVE MAN IRAQI INTSEC IN WASHINGTON.

3. MAIN AREA OF DEVELOPING MUTUAL INTEREST DURING PAST SEVEN

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KNABLE, QUANDT

PSN:015483 PAGE 01

TDR:296/13:54Z

DTG:231136Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

Wm
0023

last thing
Iraqis can do
is dump
Lowrie

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

MUNTHS WAS STRONG IRAQI INTEREST IN OBTAINING AMERICAN
TECHNOLOGY AND POSSIBLY FINANCING. TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT
EXAMPLES WERE JULY 24 PURCHASE OF BOEING A/C AND 120 MILLION
DOLLAR CONTRACT SIGNED WITH BROWN AND ROOT ON SEPT 21 FOR
DEEP SEA TERMINAL. THESE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS MAY SURVIVE
WAR, BUT AS ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT GROWS CANCELLATION BECOMES
DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. ON OCT 19 U.S. FIRMS WERE FOR EXAMPLE
PASSED OVER FOR 7-0 MILLION DOLLAR PIPELINE CONTRACT IN
FAVOR OF ITALIANS IN WHAT WAS CLEARLY POLITICAL DECISION
(BAGHDAD TEL OCT 19). IT NOW APPEARS, THEREFORE, THAT EVEN IN THIS
AREA BAAATH REGIME HAS DECIDED THAT POLITICAL IMPERATIVES
OVERRIDE PREFERENCE OF TECHNOCRATS FOR U.S. COMPANIES AND
PRODUCTS.
LWRTB
BT

PSN:015483 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:296/13:54Z DTG:231136Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

PRIORITY /ROUTINE
FSA368BREA010
DE RUESBE #2350 2961145
P R 231056Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4854
DIA PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8386
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5875
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4251
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4564
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 832
USMISSION USUN 2489

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 12350
EU 11652: NA DECON 10/23/74
TAGS: PINS MOPS XF LE IS
SUBJ: OFFICIAL FREDAYEN REACTION TO ME CLASE-FIRE

1. FOL IS FULL TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE ISSUED HERE LATL
OCT 22 BY PLD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REJECTING SC RES 338
AND ME CEASE-FIRE:

BEGIN TEXT THE PLD EXCOMM DECLARES TO OUR PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE, THE ARAB MASSES AND THE INTERNATIONAL FORCES
FRIENDLY TO THE STRUGGLE OF OUR PEOPLE THAT THE
(SECURITY COUNCIL) RESOLUTION DOES NOT PERTAIN TO THE
PALESTININE REVOLUTION. IT VOWS TO CONTINUE THE ARMED
AND POPULAR STRUGGLE BEGUN IN 1965 AGAINST THE ZIONIST
ENTITY FOR THE LIBERATION OF OUR HOMELAND AND FOR
THE RIGHT OF OUR PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY ON THEIR
OWN LAND. THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION, WHICH WAS CREATED TO
LIBERATE THE ENTIRE NATIONAL SOIL OF PALESTINE AT THE DARKEST
MOMENT OF THE PALESTINE CAUSE AND THE ARAB NATION, ASSUMED
ITS BATTLE TATIONS INSIDE OUR OCCUPIED LAND AND ON THE
ARAB FIGHTING FRONTS AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT OF FIGHTING
ON OCT 6, 73. HAVING DONE SO, WE WILL CONTINUE THE ARMED
STRUGGLE TOGETHER WITH THE FORCES OF OUR ARAB NATIONAL
TO COMPLETE THE LIBERATION OF OUR ENTIRE OCCUPIED LAND
FROM THE ZIONIST ENEMY WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS OR CONDITION.
OUR SOLDIERS AND MASSES CONTINUE TO BEAR ARMS AND TO

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PAGE 01

TOR:296/13:24Z

DTG:231056Z OCT 73

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FIGHT. OUR DETERMINATION TO ELIMINATE THE 1948 AGGRESSION IS NO LESS THAN OUR DETERMINATION TO REMOVE THE 1967 AGGRESSION. THE SC RESOLUTION (SC RES 238) IS AN OVERT attempt to prevent the ARAB MASSES FROM CONTINUING THEIR JUST STRUGGLE TO ATTAIN ALL THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. LEO TEXT.

2. IN SEPARATE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED HERE OCT 22, PLOP CALLED FOR CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL AND REJECTION OF ANY CEASE-FIRE UNTIL "TOTAL LIBERATION OF PALESTINIAN SOIL" IS ACHIEVED.

3. MOSCOW-CONTROLLED LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, IN ANOTHER STATEMENT OCT 22, CONTINUED DISPLAY SOV AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEN. IT NATURALLY REFRAINED FROM DEMONSTRATING SC RES 238, WHICH IT SAID REQUIRED "ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION" AND "FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH FEDAYEN AND ARAB PROGRESSIVE FORCES". LCP, HOWEVER, AFFIRMED ITS OPPOSITION (A) TO ANY EFFORT "TO ISOLATE PLO, SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE", FROM SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE PROBLEMS; AND (B) TO ANY SOLUTION THAT WOULD "ABANDON PART OF OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS OR BARGAIN AWAY LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE". LCP ALSO URGED CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEN MOVEMENT BY "ALL MEANS", AS WELL AS CONTINUED MEASURES AGAINST US ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS IN ME. RUFFIN

BT

PSN:015467 PAGE 02 OF 02 TDR:296/13:24/ DTG:231056Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

S E C R E T

***** COPY

FLASH
 ESA148KGA343
 DE RUESKG #5647 2961041
 Z 231030Z OCT 73
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9815

S E C R E T AMMAN 5647

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
 TAGS: DGEN
 SURJ: CEASE-FIRE
 REF: STATE 208875

1. DELIVERED MESSAGE TO RIFAI THIS A.M. AND THEN WENT TO BED MYSELF.

2. RIFAI ARGUED LONG THAT JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO FIGHT IF SYRIANS AND IRAQIS WENT INTO BATTLE, STATING JORDANIANS UNDER SYRIAN COMMAND. I ASKED IF JORDAN WOULD PERMIT SYRIANS TO INTEGRATE JORDANIANS INDIVIDUALLY OR BY PLATOONS INTO SYRIAN ARMY. HE REPLIED OF COURSE NOT. I SAID IT'S ALL THE SAME THING. JORDAN HAS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS OF ITS FORCES. IF ITS FORCES VIOLATED CEASE-FIRE, IT COULD NOT PLEAD NON-RESPONSIBILITY. IT WOULD BE JORDAN THAT WAS CONDEMNED. TOGETHER WITH SYRIA ANDYKRAQ. JORDAN HAD DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP WITH WEST AND WITH UN THAN DID SYRIA AND IRAQ. IT HAD TO PROTECT ITS ROLE AS A RESPONSIBLE COUNTRY.

3. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD ASSAD HAD CANCELLED OFFENSIVE PLANNED FOR DAWN AND THAT SYRIAN FRONT IS QUIET. WE SHOULD KEEP IT THAT WAY. EACH HOUR THAT PASSES WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR ASSAD TO GO INTO ACTION. JORDANIANS HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THEIR ROLE IN SYRIA IS ONE OF PUSHING ASSAD TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF CEASE-FIRE AND NOT AS BYSTANDERS SIMPLY STATING THAT JORDANIAN FORCES ARE UNDER SYRIAN COMMAND.

4. RIFAI SAID USG IS PANICKING ON THIS ISSUE. HE'D NEVER SEEN SO MUCH ACTIVITY AIMED AT INFLUENCING

***** WWSR COMMENT *****

HAK) SCOWCROFT, LL, QUANDT

PSN:015359

PAGE 01

TOR:296/11:06Z

DTG:231030Z OCT 73

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Wor
 23 Oct

S E C R E T

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JORDANIAN POLICY.

5. I SAID THAT HE SEEMED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL ADVOCATE OF FURTHER ACTION. THAT IS WHY I HAD COME TO HIM. IT IS KING, HOWEVER, WHO WILL PAY FOR ERRORS. IT IS KING'S REPUTATION AS MAN WITHIN-THE-LAW THAT IS AT STAKE. WE ARE NOT FRANTIC. WE ARE JUST TRYING TO GET MESSAGE THROUGH TO JORDAN THAT CEASE-FIRE APPLIES TO IT.

6. RIFAI FINALLY SAID THAT IT LOOKED AS IF FIGHTING WERE DYING DOWN ON SYRIAN FRONT. HE WOULD MAKE SURE THAT JORDANIAN FORCES ARE NOT SUCKED INTO ANYTHING. HE WOULD TALK TO COMMANDER AND TELL HIM TO REFER ALL ORDERS OR REQUESTS FROM SYRIANS BACK TO AMMAN FOR DECISION.

7. WITH THIS HALF-HEARTED COMMITMENT IN HAND I LEFT. I THINK RIFAI HAS GOT THE MESSAGE BUT HE REMAINS A SEMI-UNGUIDED MISSILE.

BROWN

BT

S E C R E T

***** COPY

S E C R E T

***** COPY

Wo
23 Oct

FLASH
 E3A436AAB423
 DE RUUSNG #5653 2961355
 231344Z OCT 73
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TU SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH ONLY

S E C R E T AMMAN 5653

Hussein oral
msg to HAK

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: XORS-1
 TAGS: DGEN
 SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

1. KING SAID AT 1330 LOCAL THAT HE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH
 DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SYRIA. SAYS THAT BATH PARTY AR.
 LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN IN CONTINUAL CONFERENCE FOR PAST TWENTY-
 FOUR HOURS AND NOTHING HAS COME OUT OF IT YET. HE CONTINUES
 PUSH FOR OFFICIAL ATTITUDE ON CEASE-FIRE BUT GETS NO RESPONSE.
 HE WILL SEND A DELEGATION TONIGHT TO DAMASCUS, CARRYING LETTER
 TO ASSAD. LETTER WILL SAY THAT JORDANIANS WILL WITHDRAW FROM
 SYRIA UNLESS DECISION FORTHCOMING.

2. KING BELIEVES THAT SYRIANS UNDER PRESSURE FROM IRAQIS AND
 THAT SYRIAN BATH PARTY HESITANT TO ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE IN FEAR OF
 BEING OUTDISTANCED ON LEFT BY IRAQI BATH. AS TIME GOES ON, HE
 IS MORE AND MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ASSAD, FEARING THAT HIS EVIDENT
 INABILITY TO IMPOSE DECISIONS INDICATES HIS WEAKNESS AND
 PRESAGES POSSIBLE COUP.

3. KING BELIEVES THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT CARRYING OUT THE
 MOSCOW BARGAIN. HE ASSUMES THAT SOVIETS WERE SUPPOSED TO GET
 DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD TO AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE. BAGHDAD, WHICH
 HAS CLOSEST LINKS WITH MOSCOW, IS THE REAL TROUBLE-MAKER.

4. HE SENDS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO SECRETARY QUANT. PLEASE
 GET IN TOUCH WITH BREZHNEV AND TELL HIM THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL
 THAT SYRIANS AND IRAQIS ACCEDE TO CEASE-FIRE AND THAT SOVIETS
 MUST MAKE THIS POINT STRONGLY IN BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS. UNQUOTE.

5. KING HAS SENT MESSAGE TO SADAT, EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN
 ABOUT SYRIAN POSITION AND ASKING SADAT TO DO SOMETHING. HE IS
 AWAITING A REPLY.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

QUANDT

PSN:015555

PAGE 01


TOR:296/15:00Z

DTG:231344Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

***** COPY

11 good pt.
What does
Hyland
say?



*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

OP IMED /ROUTINE
ESA4350RA804
DE RUEUR 03221 2961317
D R 231315Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4102

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2723
AMEMBASSY BEIROUT 3988
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3303
DISMISSION USOM 2243

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO 3221

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS FG IS

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION: REPORT BY
DE BORCHGRAVE

1. DE BORCHGRAVE HAS GIVEN US BRIEFING FOLLOWING RETURN FROM 24-HOUR VISIT TO EGYPTIAN FRONT. AS REPORTED ELSEWHERE, VISIT WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR FAYID AREA. IN FACT, DE BORCHGRAVE WAS TAKEN NOWHERE NEAR FAYID. HIS JEEP WAS DIVERTED NORTH FROM ISMAILIYA ROAD AT A POINT TO THE WEST OF ABU SUWEIR AND WITH LITTLE EXPLANATION AS TO WHY HE WAS TAKEN TO KANTARA. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO A POINT WHICH HE BELIEVES WAS NO MORE THAN SIX MILES EAST OF KANTARA, ALTHOUGH EGYPTIAN BRIGADIER GENERAL GUIDO SAID THAT THEY WERE 20 KILOMETERS EAST OF CANAL.

2. AT POINT OF MAXIMUM PENETRATION, DE BORCHGRAVE'S JEEP BREASTED A RISE ONLY TO FACE AN ISRAELI CENTURION TANK WHICH PROCEEDED TO LET OFF SEVERAL SHELLS IN HIS DIRECTION AT POINT-BLANK RANGE. JEEP REVERSED, RETURNED TO SECOND LINE OF EGYPTIAN DEFENSE AND AS DE BORCHGRAVE DESCRIBED IT, HE AND COLLEAGUES WERE BARELY ABLE TO JUMP INTO NEARBY FLYHOLE WHEN PHANTOMS ARRIVED. DE BORCHGRAVE STATES HE WAS BOMBED BY PHANTOMS AND SHELLED BY IDF ARTILLERY FOR HOURS. HE WITNESSED PHANTOM ATTACKS FROM RELATIVELY HIGH ALTITUDE, AND SAW EGYPTIAN SAM'S BEING RELEASED IN GREAT NUMBERS. HE ONLY SAW ONE PHANTOM HIT, AND BELIEVES THAT OTHER SAM'S WERE NOT EFFECTIVE.

3. HE THEN RETURNED TO KANTARA SHORTLY BEFORE ANNOUNCED TIME

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PAGE 01

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OF CEASEFIRE. DE BURCHGRAVE STATES THAT WITHIN MINUTES AFTER TIME OF CEASEFIRE, ENTIRE TOWN ERUPTED WITH FIRING FROM VIRTUALLY EVERY DIRECTION. FIRING WAS APPARENTLY NOT DIRECTED AT ISRAELIS (WHO WERE WELL OVER HORIZON) BUT WAS AIMLESS. DE BURCHGRAVE SAYS HE WITNESSED MUTINY WITHIN EGYPTIAN ARMY AT KANTARA FOR 45 MINUTES, WHILE TROOPS AT ALL LEVELS EXPRESSED BITTER PROTEST AT SADAT'S DECISION TO CONCLUDE CEASEFIRE WITH ISRAELIS. FIRING WAS ONLY HALTED AFTER THREAT BY EGYPTIAN AREA COMMANDER TO MURDER ANY EGYPTIAN TROOPS WHO CONTINUED TO SHOOT.

4. DE BURCHGRAVE RETURNED TO CAIRO AT NOON TODAY, OCTOBER 23, AND PROCEEDED TO GHORBAL'S OFFICE. GHORBAL WAS LIVELY AT WHAT HE ASSERTED WAS MASSIVE VIOLATION BY ISRAELIS OF CEASEFIRE PROVISIONS. DURING NIGHT OF OCTOBER 22-23 THEY HAD PUSHED ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT ACROSS CANAL NEAR ISMAILIYA AND GREAT BITTER LAKE AND HAD THROUGHOUT MORNING SUCCEEDED IN CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENING THEIR POSITION ON WEST BANK.

5. GHORBAL BLAMED US. HE SAID HE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT ISRAELI VIOLATIONS WERE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO TEL AVIV. HE LATER MODIFIED THIS TO SUGGEST ANOTHER EXPLANATION, THAT ISRAELIS THEMSELVES DID NOT GIVE A DAMN ABOUT WHAT US THOUGHT OR DID NOW THAT US RESUPPLY HAD MORE THAN MADE UP FOR LOSSES SUFFERED IN WAR. GHORBAL SAID THAT RUSSIANS SEEMED UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING AND PHYSICALLY COULD NOT MATCH US RESUPPLY EFFORT.

6. FOR DEPARTMENT: DE BURCHGRAVE ASKS THAT NEWSWEEK HEAD OFFICE BE INFORMED OF HIS RETURN TO CAIRO.
SMITH
BT

*we showed
remind Eg
Aug 7 & after
1970!*

PSN:015504 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:296/14:13Z DTG:231315Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

FRIS 177

TASS CORRESPONDENT SCORES AL-QADHDHAFI STAND

L231601 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1514 GMT 23 OCT 73 L

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 23 TASS--TASS CORRESPONDENT ASKOLD RIRYUKOV WRITES:

LIBYAN LEADER COLONEL AL-QADHDHAFI IS DISSATISFIED. HE DOES NOT LIKE THE ADOPTION BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF A RESOLUTION THE AIM OF WHICH IS TO PUT AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES AND TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE NEWSPAPER "LE MONDE", AL-QADHDHAFI, UNAUTHORIZED, UNDERTAKES TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF ALL THE ARABS. "CEASEFIRE? NEVER", HE EXCLAIMS. A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CALLED FOR IS DESCRIBED BY AL-QADHDHAFI IN NO OTHER WAY THAN AS BETRAYAL AND HE THREATENS THOSE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHICH WILL AGREE TO THE SETTLEMENT WITH NEITHER MORE NOR LESS THAN AN OVERTHROW.

THE COLONEL'S SPECIAL DISCONTENT HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE ATTITUDE TAKEN IN THIS MATTER BY THE SOVIET UNION WHICH REGARDS, IF WE ARE TO BELIEVE THE NEWSPAPER "LE MONDE", AS THE MAIN ENEMY OF THE ARAB WORLD.

IT IS AS IF IT NEVER OCCURRED TO THE HEAD OF THE LIBYAN STATE --WHO STAYS BACK IN SAFETY AND IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ARAB PEOPLES FIGHTING AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR AND WHO DOES NOT RPT NOT GIVE THEM AN EFFECTIVE SUPPORT-- THAT THE PRESENT RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT COME JUST OUT OF A CLEAR SKY. IT HAS BEEN RESULTANT OF SERIOUS AND DIFFICULT PREPARATION, INTENSIVE CONTACTS AT HIGH LEVEL, NOTABLY, BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF ARAB STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AMONG A NUMBER OF ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND, LASTLY, BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA.

IT IS AS IF HE DOES NOT KNOW ABOUT THE STATEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR AS-SADAT THAT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DRAFTING OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS PEACE PLAN PUT FORWARD BY THE HEAD OF THE EGYPTIAN STATE IN HIS SPEECH IN THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND, LASTLY, AL-QADHDHAFI IGNORED ANWAR AS-SADAT'S WORDS THAT THOSE BASIC CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAD LED TO THE CHANGE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AS A WHOLE WERE ENHANCED AND CONSOLIDATED BY THE HEROIC ACTION OF THE ARAB ARMED FORCES WHO DEMONSTRATED THEIR COURAGE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC WHO VIEW IT AS A CORROBORATION OF THE FACT THAT THE POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE, WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PERSISTENTLY TRANSLATES INTO LIFE, BEARS FRUIT HERE, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TOO.

EXCESSIVELY MILITANT DECLARATIONS BY AL-QADHDHAFI INDICATE THAT THE LIBYAN LEADER DOES NOT WISH TO RECKON WITH EITHER LASTING INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE OF MANKIND NOR WITH WHAT THE ARAB PEOPLES--VICTIMS OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION-- ARE INTERESTED IN AT THE PRESENT MOMENT.

AS FAR AS AL-QADHDHAFI'S ATTACKS ON THE SOVIET UNION ARE CONCERNED IT IS NOT FOR HIM TO JUDGE THE ROLE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PLAYED AND CONTINUES TO PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR THE TRIUMPH OF JUSTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

23 OCT 1824Z HWM/GS

Co
Oct 23

Sov criticism
of Qadhafi

Egyptian
interpretation

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DP IMMED
FSA138RAA522
DE RUESRA #4663/1 2961030
O 230935Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5275

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 147
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2020
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4651
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 6048
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2044
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2693
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 838
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 461
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1329
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 678
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 79
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 599
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 127
USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 4663

DEPT PASS CAIRO
BEIRUT ALSO FOR BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, SA, XF

SUBJECT: SAUDI BAN ON OIL SHIPMENTS TO U.S.

REF: A) JIDDA 4621; B) JIDDA 4615; C) JIDDA 4616
D) JIDDA 4630; E) JIDDA 4600; F) JIDDA 4620

SUMMARY: SAUDI DECISION TO CUT OFF OIL SHIPMENTS TO
U.S. ATTRIBUTABLE TO KING'S OWN DECISION; KING ANGRY
AT ANNOUNCEMENT OF LARGE U.S. MILITARY GRANT PROGRAMS
TO ISRAEL AND PROBABLY FELT THAT ANY LESSER RESPONSE
WOULD LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA UNCOMFORTABLY ISOLATED IN
ARAB WORLD. U.S. MISSION CONTACTS WITH HIGH-LEVEL
SAG OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, INDICATE SAG WISHES TO MINIMIZE
DAMAGE THAT PRESENT CRISIS MAY DO TO US-SAG RELATIONS
JOINT US-USSR RESOLUTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL POTENTIALLY A
RADICALLY POSITIVE STEP; BUT IF IT DOES NOT SUCCEED
SAG MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON U.S.
INTERESTS IN MILITARY, COMMERCIAL, ENERGY AND FINANCIAL

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AREAS. EMBASSY IS STRESSING WITH SAG NEED THAT CHANNELLS OF COMMUNICATION REMAIN OPEN, AND THAT EACH SIDE GIVE OTHER MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY MEASURES IT IS CONTEMPLATING. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SAG DECISION TO BAN PETROLEUM EXPORTS TO U.S. STEMMED FROM KING FAISAL HIMSELF. DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIGH-RANKING SAG OFFICIALS AND AMBASSADOR (REF B AND E) IN 24 HOURS PREVIOUS, HAD NOT INDICATED SAG ON VERGE OF TAKING SUCH BIG STEP.

2. SOURCES IN ROYAL DIWAN OCT 21 HAVE CONFIRMED TO EMBASSY THAT DECISION TAKEN BY KING, AND WAS PRINCIPALLY MOTIVATED BY U.S. PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH 2.2 BILLION DOLLARS OF GRANT MILITARY AID. WE TOLD BY CHIEF OF ROYAL DIWAN, AHMAD ABDUL WAHAB (A WELL-ADJUSTED PRO-AMERICAN FIGURE) THAT KING WAS AS FURIOUS AS HE HAD EVER SEEN HIM AND THAT HE TOOK PARTICULAR UMBRAGE AT WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REASSURING TONE OF VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM USG, AND U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT OF "INCREDIBLE" AMOUNT OF AID TO GHI. KING'S SUBSEQUENT CALL FOR JIHAD (FBIS KYRENIA 210810Z OCT 73) CAN ALSO BE ASCRIBED TO KING'S DISPLEASURE. KING'S MOOD EMPHATICALLY REFLECTED ALSO BY ABLE, NATIONALIST MINISTER HISHAM NAZER, HEAD OF CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION.

3. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, OVERSTRESS THE CAUSATIVE EFFECT OF PURE EMOTION IN KING'S DECISION TO CUT BACK OIL SHIPMENTS TO U.S. A NUMBER OF ARAB COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEP OF BANNING SUCH SHIPMENTS, AND YAMANI HAD INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT OTHERS WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW (REF B). AS IMPACT OF U.S. AID DECISION MADE ITSELF FELT IN ARAB WORLD, KING MAY HAVE FELT THAT SAG WOULD OCCUPY EXPOSED SALIENT IF IT--ALONE AMONG ARAB OIL PRODUCERS--CONTINUED TO PROVIDE OIL TO U.S.

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5276

INFO AMEMBASSY ADD DUA I IMMEDIATE 0148
AMEMBASSY AMMA IMMEDIATE 2021
AMEMBASSY RIYAD IMMEDIATE 4652
AMCONSUL QUAMRAN IMMEDIATE 6049
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2045
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2674
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0839
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0462
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1330
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0679
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0080
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0600
USMISSION LC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0128
USMISSION BECD PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 JIDDA 4603

DEPT PASS CAIRO
REIRUT ALSO FOR BAGHDAD

4. EMBASSY CONTACTS ELSEWHERE IN SAG. MOREOVER, TEND TO
CONFIRM OUR ASSESSMENT THAT SAG WISHES MINIMIZE DAMAGE
THAT PRESENT CRISIS COULD CAUSE TO US-SAUDI RELATIONS.
DCM'S DISCUSSION WITH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY FOR
WESTERN REGION OCT 20 MADE CLEAR SAG'S GREAT CONCERN
WAS SECURITY, WELL-BEING, AND GOOD MORALE OF AMCITS IN
SAUDI ARABIA (REF F). ALSO, DURING MEETING OCT 21
BETWEEN CHIEF OF U.S. MILITARY TRAINING MISSION (COSMTH),
GENERAL HILL AND DEPUTY MUDA (AND KING'S BROTHER) PRINCE
TUPKI, PRINCE STATED "WE HAVE HAD TO TAKE CERTAIN POLITICAL
DECISIONS DURING THE WAR JUST AS YOU HAVE, BUT THAT MUST
BE KEPT ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MUDA AND USMTH." PRINCE IN SUBBER MOOD, BUT WAS AT ALL
TIMES COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY TO GENERAL HILL AND HIS STAFF.

5. FURTHER SAUDI REACTIONS WILL BE DETERMINED PARTLY BY

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WHAT WE DO AND SOME BY COURSE OF ARAB/ISRAELI FIGHTING. JOINT US-UNSC RESOLUTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL POTENTIALLY RADICALLY POSITIVE STEP; BUT IF PROGRESS NOT FOLLOWING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND IF THE ARABS THEN FACE PROSPECT OF SERIOUS MILITARY SETBACK OR IF A CEASEFIRE IS NOT RAPIDLY FOLLOWED BY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM AT LEAST SOME ARAB LANDS, SAUDIS WOULD RESPOND MUCH AS WOULD THEIR NEIGHBORS AND CAST ABOUT FOR WAYS TO PRESSURE/PUNISH U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPEANS. AMONG THE MEASURES THEY COULD TAKE MIGHT BE ACCELERATED USE OF OIL WEAPONS (FURTHER CUTS IN PRODUCTION OR NATIONALIZATION OF U.S. ASSETS), TERMINATION OF U.S. MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS (WHICH NUMBER CIRCA 20 EACH WEEK), OR USE FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO APPLY PRESSURE ON DOLLAR. (AMBASSADOR HAS ALREADY POINTED OUT TO MIN YAMANI THIS WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE-- REF C, AND WE ARE TOLD BY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT DIRECTION OF MONETARY AGENCY ANWAR ALI OPPOSES SUCH A STEP.) WE MIGHT ALSO EXPECT CALLY BY SOME RADICAL OF COMBATANT ARAB NATION FOR MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OR CHIEFS OF STATES, AND THAT SOME PRETTY NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS RE OUR MIDDLE EAST INTERESTS WOULD EMERGE FROM ANY SUCH GATHERING.

6. SAG ACTION COULD ALSO DELIVER A SETBACK TO IMPORTANT U.S. COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY SALES. SAG HAS GROWN TO BE ONE OF LARGEST MARKETS FOR AMERICAN PRODUCTS BETWEEN EUROPE AND JAPAN, WITH SALES RUNNING AT MORE THAN A THIRD OF A BILLION DOLLARS THIS YEAR. OUR MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS HERETOFORE HAVE IN PAST THREE YEARS EXCEEDED 500 MILLION DOLLARS, AND THERE ARE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR FRS CASH SALES OF A SIMILAR ORDER TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT EUROPE, PARTICULARLY FRENCH AND BRITISH SOURCES, ARE MORE THAN PREPARED TO PICK UP THE FALLOUT FROM THE AMERICAN DILEMMA IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

Kuwaitis are thinking of banning US products

7. IN MEANTIME, AMBASSADOR HAS PASSED WORD TO CHIEF OF ROYAL DIWAN THAT IT ESSENTIAL FOR CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HIM AND SAG TO REMAIN OPEN AT ALL TIMES. AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID THAT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE STRAIN OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR RELATIONS, IT IMPORTANT THAT EACH SIDE BE GIVEN MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NOTICE OF STEPS OTHER MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING; DIALOGUE MUST GO ON. AMBASSADOR MAKING SAME POINT ALSO TO MINIST YAMANI WHO BASICALLY WELL DISPOSED TO SAG'S WESTERN CONNECTION, AND MIGHT THUS BE USEFUL IN A SEMI-PRIVATE ROLE.

8. FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO SAUDI ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. OIL AND OTHER INTERESTS, WE SHOULD AVOID ACRIMONIOUS

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COMMENTS, SINCE THESE TEND TO KEEP AN UNHELPFUL DIALOGUE
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0240

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6462
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5014
USINT CAIRO 3602
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4996
USMISSION USM NY 3908

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8503

ED 1155Z: SDS

TAGS: PINT PFOR IS

SUBJ: OPPOSITION ATTACK ON GOI FOR CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION

1. LATE OCTOBER 22 LIKUD BLNC ISSUED DECLARATION STATING:
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 22 WOULD NOT
LEAD TO PEACE BUT WOULD ENDANGER ISRAEL'S SECURITY
B. USSR IS CONTINUING ARMS RESUPPLY OF ARABS, AND EVEN IF CE
PROVES ARABS MAY CONDUCT SURPRISE ATTACK
C. LIKUD OPPOSES GOI ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION
D. GOI GUILTY OF GRAVE ERROR IN WLFK PRECEDING WAR IT NOT
ACTING ON RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE IT HAD ABOUT IMMINENT DANGER,
BY MOBILIZING AND BY DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL ISRAELI FORCES TO NORTH
AND SOUTH..
E. LIKUD CALL ON ISRAELI PEOPLE TO ABOLISH WRONG GOI POLICY
AND SHAPE NEW ONE.

2. WE ARE INFORMED LABOR PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL YADIEL
EARLY OCTOBER 22 RESPONDED TO LIKUD IN CONVERSATION WITH
JOURNALISTS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:
A. PARTY REGRETS LIKUD COULD NOT HOLD BACK FROM THIS ATTACK
UNTIL FIRING ALONG FRONTLINES HAD REALLY CEASED; LIKUD IS MAKING
SERIOUS ACCUSATIONS AGAINST GOI AND IDF AT TIME WHEN GOI
AND IDF ARE NOT FREE TO EXPLAIN REASONS WHICH LAY BEHIND
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS
B. AS FOR CEASEFIRE, GOI ACCEPTED USG APPEAL BECAUSE US
FRIENDSHIP AND US MILITARY AID ARE VITAL FACTOR IN EACH
MILITARY OPERATION WHICH IS FORCED ON ISRAEL

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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C. UNSC RESOLUTION CALLS FOR FIRST TIME FOR SOMETHING NOT SPECIFIED IN RESOLUTION 242: IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES, PARALLEL WITH CEASEFIRE.

3. MAARIV TODAY CITES LABOR PARTY SOURCES AS EXPRESSING INDIGNATION AT LIKUD ATTACK BECAUSE LIKUD KNESSET MEMBERS SIT ON COMMITTEES WHICH RECEIVED UP TO MINUTE INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY BRIEFINGS BEFORE AND DURING WAR, AND KNOW CHARGES ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACTS.

4. WE UNDERSTAND AT KNESSET SESSION FOUR PM TODAY MKS MEIR WILL MAKE STATEMENT, LIKUD WILL MAKE STATEMENT, MPS MEIR MAY ANSWER, AND VOTE WILL BE TAKEN ON GOI DECISION TO ACCEPT OCTOBER 22 UNSC RESOLUTION.

5. WE BELIEVE GOI WILL WIN KNESSET VOTE BUT NOT NECESSARILY BY MUCH MARGIN, AND WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF ACrimonious DEBATE BREAKS OUT. KEY FACTOR IS ATTITUDE OF SENIOR MILITARY AND WHETHER THEY WILL MAKE THEIR ATTITUDE KNOWN. SINCE BOTH SIDES ARE CLAIMING TO BE IN AGREEMENT WITH THEIR VIEWPOINT, IN THIS CONNECTIONS FACT THAT REACTIVATED GENERAL SHARON, WHO IS SAID TO HAVE CONCEIVED ISRAELI BRIDGEHEAD STRATEGY WEST OF CANAL AND TO HAVE SHARED DE FACTO COMMAND OF SUEZ FRONT WITH REACTIVATED GENERAL BARLEV, MAY EMERGE AS MAJOR HERO OF THIS WAR, COULD AFFECT SITUATION. IT WAS SHARON WHO ORIGINATED IDEA OF CREATING LIKUD BLOC THIS SUMMER, AND HE IS IMPORTANT FIGURE IN IT. IN SHORT, LABOR ALIGNMENT SEEMS IN FOR SOME ROUGH SLEDDING IN WEEKS AHEAD IN DEFENDING ITS NATIONAL-SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICIES.
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DE RUEHC #9518 2962359
O P 232335Z OCT 73
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TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 8017

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 8137
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 4730
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6097
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4038

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 209518

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: XF

SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAELI POW RELEASES

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, DURING MOSCOW TALKS SECRETARY
RAISED WITH SOVIETS IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AND TOTAL EX-
CHANGE OF POWS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES. WHILE
NOT INCLUDED IN U.S.-SOVIET SPONSORED SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION, WE AND SOVIETS AGREED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE
AS MATTERS OF FIRST PRIORITY TO ENCOURAGE EARLY (E.G.,
WITHIN 72 HOURS) AND COMPLETE POW EXCHANGE.

2. DURING TALKS IN ISRAEL ON ROUTE BACK FROM MOSCOW, IT
WAS APPARENT THAT ISRAELIS ATTACH HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO
THIS AND THAT PROSPECTS FOR STABILIZING CEASEFIRE AND
MOVING INTO ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE SERIOUSLY
IMPEDED IF POW EXCHANGE BECOMES A MAJOR ISSUE. ISRAELIS
ARE CLEARLY PREPARED FOR EARLY AND COMPLETE EXCHANGE, AND
THE QUESTION IS WHETHER SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS ARE SIMILARLY
PREPARED.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: YOU SHOULD INFORM GALLOPIN,
PRESIDENT OF ICRC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, OF FOREGOING IN

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STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND INDICATE USG READINESS TO WORK
WITH ICRC TO BRING ABOUT EARLY AND COMPLETE POW RE-
LEASES ON BOTH SIDES. YOU SHOULD TELL ICRC WE WOULD
APPRECIATE HEARING FROM THEM IF THEY ENCOUNTER
DIFFICULTIES WITH EITHER SIDE IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE,
AS WELL AS ANY INFORMATION ON STEPS UNDERWAY RE POW
RELEASES. HAS EITHER SIDE YET TAKEN ANY STEPS WITH
ICRC TO GET POW RELEASES GOING? KISSINGER
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